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How Do Donor-led Empowerment and Accountability Activities Take Scale 
into Account? Evidence from DFID Programmes in Contexts of Fragility, 
Conflict and Violence 
Colin Anderson, Jonathan Fox and John Gaventa 
 
Summary 
Development donors invest significantly in governance reform, including in contexts 
characterised by conflict and fragility. However, there is relatively little comparative study of 
their change strategies, and little understanding of what works and why. This paper explores 
the strategies of six recent DFID-funded programmes in Mozambique, Myanmar, and 
Pakistan with empowerment and accountability aims. Document review and field interviews 
are used to analyse the application of multi-scalar or multi-level change strategies, since 
such approaches are hypothesised to potentially generate more leverage for public 
accountability reforms. Analysis suggests that these strategies can strengthen citizen ability 
to navigate governance systems to resolve problems and claim accountability, and can 
bolster pro-accountability coalitions’ internal solidarity and external legitimacy. Multi-level 
strategies also appear associated with establishing more significant pressure for reform than 
exclusively local or national approaches. Yet conventional project reporting focuses on 
counting activities and outputs rather than analysing the dynamic, interactive processes at 
work in these strategies, and few evaluations are publicly accessible. To fully understand 
what kinds of action strengthen citizen demands for accountability requires a more 
transparent and rigorous approach to learning from donor-led governance interventions. 
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Executive summary 
Recent years have seen significant development donor investment and activity focused on 
improving governance relationships in contexts characterised by conflict and fragility. There 
is relatively little comparative study of many of the strategies that they adopt and their effects, 
particularly how far they support or challenge a number of research-based propositions about 
what is more likely to support shifts in empowerment and accountability. In this paper we 
explore one such proposition – that using multi-level or multi-scalar strategies might be 
important. Multi-scalar strategies are those that deliberately try to join up action across a 
number of sites and institutions or organisations. We explore this idea by looking in detail at 
six programmes designed and funded by the UK Department for International Development 
that have operated in parallel in Mozambique, Myanmar, and Pakistan during the past five 
years. The programmes we looked at all attempted to open up more space for the 
involvement of ordinary citizens in public service decision-making and prioritisation, following 
a logic that this could support a shift towards more inclusive and responsive governance. 
 
Drawing on interviews and workshops with people involved in these programmes in each 
country as well as an extensive review of programme documents and impact evidence, we 
found that: 
 
• All of the programmes were designed to some extent to use multi-level strategies. 
Some very deliberately responded to evidence that social accountability efforts to 
mobilise citizens around the quality of local services tend to produce results only at that 
level, rather than seeding systemic reforms. Others set out ambitions to link up 
fractured organisations and constituencies. 
• In part this responded to understandings of complex governance arrangements and 
norms in their contexts. Common across these were limited organised citizen demand 
for service or policy improvements, diffuse sources of formal and informal authority and 
decision-making, and norms constraining the degree of ‘voice’ that many groups – 
particularly women – were able to exercise. 
• Three distinct multi-scalar strategies were used in practice, with each programme 
tending to focus largely on one of these: 
 
a) Vertical aggregation of citizen demands and claims on authorities, 
conveying these upward to those responsible for public services.   
b) Vertical integration of civil society organisations and campaigns, linking 
civic organisations at the grassroots with sub-national and national level civil 
society activism and lobbying. 
c) Developing horizontal linkages and networks, so that organisations and 
reformists working across geographies or sectors could find common ground and 
act jointly. 
 
• Using multi-scalar strategies helped some programmes to navigate the governance 
and service delivery landscape to activate accountability at different levels, move 
around obstacles, and highlight systemic issues. 
• Linking up action and organisations both horizontally and vertically was also important 
in building and activating solidarity with loose coalitions for reform, and in actors’ 
perceptions of how legitimate their claims and actions seemed to others. 
• Multi-scalar strategies were also involved where programmes argued that they had 
contributed to systemic changes in policy and practice beyond just their localised sites 
of operation, partly in building a weight of evidence, and partly in activating multi-level 
pressure for reform. 
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We are also able to make some more general reflection on the ability to learn about 
strategies for social change from exploring DFID-funded programmes in this way. We found: 
 
• Important gaps and limitations in publicly available documentation on this set of 
programmes, in particular evaluative information that identifies what changes have 
taken place and why. 
• Patchy practice in formal evaluation, which limits how conclusive we could be about 
programme success and contributing factors, and very few publicly available 
evaluations of this kind. 
• Significant sources of un-exploited evidence that could inform a stronger understanding 
of what works, mostly held by implementing organisations rather than DFID itself. 
• A gap between what programmes formally measured their success on and what they 
are actually seeking to do – undermining their contribution to the evidence base as well 
as producing ongoing tension between practices and measurements of success. 
• Significant barriers to the rigorous and open assessment of programme outcomes as a 
result of incentives in the aid architecture to be seen to succeed and the competitive 
commercial value of learning and evidence in the sub-contracted delivery model. 
 
Taken together, we can see in the six programmes explored how programme designers and 
practitioners build in multi-scalar strategies as a contextual response to the complexities of 
governance in fragile and conflict-affected settings and a tactical response to anti-
accountability forces. There is the potential both in these programmes and presumably in 
similar activities in other contexts to learn more about when and how these tactics work. For 
this learning to happen, however, there needs to be a shift in incentives towards greater 
transparency and rigorous assessment of what these donor-funded programmes are 
achieving, and what this means for those on the ground seeking to build or demand more 
accountable governance. 
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1  Introduction 
Decisions that matter to people’s lives are taken in many places within systems of 
governance. They are taken both at local and national levels, across different sets of actors 
or institutions, and across different geographies within the same country. They are taken by 
those with both formal and informal authority, constrained by political systems and 
arrangements that limit their autonomy and structure their interests. And they are 
underpinned by the wider, often fluctuating, balance of power between these different sites, 
institutions, and actors. In contexts characterised and affected by fragility, conflict and 
violence, we might expect this governance landscape to be particularly complex. Such 
complexity has significant ramifications for anyone trying to secure accountability from 
decision makers or introduce pro-accountability reform. Where are the decisions that matter 
really taken? Which parts of the system need to be targeted to initiate and sustain change?  
 
The answers to these questions matter most to those directly trying to get problems solved or 
push for reforms to systems they live and contend with on a daily basis. In many countries 
they also matter to development donors, who in recent years have increasingly set their 
sights on the development of more accountable governance institutions and public service 
responsiveness to citizens. In 2014, Thomas Carothers and Saskia Brechenmacher referred 
to this ambition as a ‘new development consensus’ (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). 
This trend sees donors funding activities that they hope will build the power of citizens to hold 
authorities to account, and establish new institutional channels through which they can 
exercise that power. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has been part 
of this consensus. In 2011, DFID developed a specific policy frame on the empowerment and 
accountability ambitions of its programming (DFID 2011c). Shortly after this policy framing, a 
macro-evaluation of DFID activities with stated empowerment and accountability aims started 
with a sample of 2,379 individual projects (e-Pact 2016: 16). This included many activities in 
contexts affected by conflict and violence, and where governance is considered to be ‘fragile’ 
– contexts where we might expect the governance landscape to be particularly complex, 
liable to flux, and harder to analyse clearly. DFID’s approach to these contexts, set out in a 
number of separate policy statements, position empowerment and accountability activities as 
part of building institutions that consolidate democratic practices and generate gains in what 
people can expect of their governments; delivering a ‘peace dividend’ and rebuilding a social 
contract (DFID 2016a)  
 
In this paper we explore how far a number of DFID-funded development programmes in 
conflict-affected contexts take into account the multi-sited nature of governance systems and 
use strategies that respond to this important feature of governance realities. We look at what 
kinds of strategies they use, and with what reported effects, exploring what the evidence 
generated by these programmes tells us about using what we call multi-scalar strategies. We 
use the notion of scale not in the common sense of ‘scaling up’ development activities1 but in 
the sense of working across different levels and sites in governance landscapes, and 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal dimensions of scale that might be relevant to 
achieving change in governance relationships. By vertical scale we refer to the hierarchy of 
decision-making and spaces for citizen engagement and representation from the local to the 
national, and supra-national levels. By horizontal scale we refer to connections across 
geographical areas, service sectors or institutions at a similar level of decision-making or 
authority.  
 
 
1  In the development lexicon, ‘scaling’ has become synonymous with ambitions to take successful activities or 
approaches to a wider population, or to expand on piloted activities. For examples see (Cooley and Kohl 2006; Cooley 
and Papoulidis 2017; Hartmann and Linn 2008; Linn 2012; McLean et al. 2019; Simmons et al. 2007). 
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The lens of ‘taking scale into account’ allows us to place a focus on strategies of action that 
link various sites of action towards empowerment and accountability, which has been argued 
to be a key feature in moving from tactical to more strategic approaches more likely to 
generate sustained change (Fox 2015, 2016). For development donors, engaging with the 
realities of governance and accountability environments in this way responds to now-
common appeals to ‘think and work politically’ or ‘do development differently’.2 These 
appeals sit within a wider literature that is at best equivocal about whether donors and 
externally driven programmes stand much chance of success in building what might be seen 
as ‘countervailing power’ to entrenched interests (Blackburn et al. 2002; Gibson and 
Woolcock 2008). We explore these and other debates that lie behind our enquiry in Section 2. 
 
The analysis here is based on research undertaken during 2017 and 2018 as part of the 
DFID-funded Action for Empowerment and Accountability research programme,3 and focuses 
on DFID programmes in Myanmar, Mozambique, and Pakistan. The research involved 
structured documentary review, fieldwork interviews with practitioners, and a consolidating 
learning workshop with practitioners and other researchers. Our approach and the 
assessment of the evidence we were able to gather from these exercises is detailed in 
Section 3.  
 
We narrowed from an original sample of twenty-one DFID programmes to six programmes to 
explore in more depth. Section 4 gives a short overview of each of these six case study 
programmes, explaining their backgrounds and contexts, main activities, and reported 
achievements. In Section 5 we illustrate how the programmes share a set of common 
understandings of the core challenge of instituting more accountable governance 
relationships in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Their contextual analyses had many 
commonalities, and all recognised the multi-scalar nature of governance systems in the 
different countries they analysed. They also shared rationales for intervention and drew from 
a similar repertoire of action and intervention to support claims for accountability. 
 
In Section 6 we look at how the programmes applied their shared understanding that scale 
matters in achieving governance change. We distinguish three distinct multi-scalar strategies 
used. One purposefully attempted to surface citizen needs, demands and experiences 
through vertical hierarchies of decision-making. Another worked explicitly to develop 
connections between national, sub-national, and local organisations and reform coalitions to 
strengthen advocacy at each level. A third common approach was to build horizontal 
networks and relationships to strengthen pro-accountability efforts and countervailing power.  
 
Section 7 explores some of the effects reported of these multi-scalar strategies. We propose 
three distinguishable categories of effects drawn inductively from the reports of programme 
activity and outcomes. First, we look at the evidence that multi-scalar approaches allowed 
the programmes to navigate layers of decision-making and spaces for accountability. We 
found that several programmes reported direct localised improvements through engaging 
citizens in deliberation and equipping them with capacities and opportunities to make claims 
on authorities for better services or for the accountability of local providers and officials. To 
some degree, these gains appear to have been supported by the existence of hierarchies 
where unresolved claims could be escalated or networks through which resistance to 
accountability could be circumnavigated. This appears particularly important given common 
contextual conditions where informal power and low levels of official delegated authority sit 
side by side. We then explore effects of multi-scalar approaches on the internal solidarity of 
 
2  These phrases allude to particular schools of thought on how development programmes can be more effective, 
particularly in engaging with local political contexts. For recent reviews see (Dasandi et al. 2019; McCulloch and Piron 
2019). 
3  Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) is a five-year enquiry into how processes of social and political 
action lead to empowerment and accountability outcomes in contexts of fragility, conflict, and violence. A core research 
question asks about the role of external actors such as development donors in supporting such processes. 
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pro-accountability coalitions, and external perceptions of the legitimacy of their claims. We 
illustrate these with examples of connections developed between otherwise isolated sites of 
action, and cases where these articulated to respond to challenges in gaining accountability 
or reform. The final set of effects explored are around the use of multi-scalar strategies to 
build wider pressure for reform, both to the content of public policy but also to the underlying 
accountability eco-system. Reports of changes like these are particularly complicated by 
difficulties in attribution from a limited evidence base, but we explore how multi-scalar 
strategies might have contributed to reform successes claimed by some programmes. 
 
In Section 8 we explain the limitations of this evidence base in more depth. During our study 
we sought to understand how programmes measured and evidenced their multi-scalar 
strategies and effects on the basis that this might contribute to the wider evidence on when, 
where, and how multi-scalar strategies work to achieve accountability. We looked at official 
monitoring frameworks and regular performance measurement as well as more reflective and 
evaluative content found in some programme documentation, and in some cases 
independent assessments and evaluations. Although the programmes we looked at had very 
similar aims and used similar strategies, a diversity of approaches to monitoring and 
evaluation prevents much rigorous comparison on the basis of the available evidence. We 
conclude this section with some reflections on what this means in terms of learning from the 
programmes – in particular the incongruities we found between programme aims and 
measures of success, the obstacles to clear-sighted evaluation of impact, and the limits on 
informing new programming decisions.  
 
The final section draws together the implications of our analysis. We note the limitations of 
what we can say about actual effects and interactions but indicate some ways in which this 
study might motivate and shape further analysis of these and other programmes, and add to 
the theoretical propositions on why multi-scalar approaches are warranted. 
 
 
2  Situating the study  
Establishing accountable governance institutions has become increasingly central to 
conceptions of what good development looks like in the past two decades (Booth 2012; 
Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). Conceived of both as an outcome in itself and as a 
precursor or requirement for other important outcomes, accountability has become regarded 
as a key part of supporting sustainable development on the basis that it generates more 
responsive behaviour from those in authority, holds those in power in check, and forms state-
society bargains or social contracts over the provision of goods and entitlements over time. 
Sustainable Development Goal 16 explicitly links such outcomes with inclusivity, peace and 
freedom from violence.  
 
Achieving these kinds of institutions and relationships is of course complex and faces many 
barriers. For one, it is not necessarily in the interests of those in power to make themselves 
more answerable to the population at large. Such answerability not only comes with risks of 
individual sanction, but also with disrupting or exposing the networks of power and influence 
that sustain social and political systems. Even if it is in the interests of those in power 
develop more accountable public institutions, it is not necessarily easy for them to do. For 
example, establishing greater accountability for delivery of public services requires that those 
with formal authority are able to resource and direct those services, which is perhaps easier 
said than done. Anti-accountability forces can be strong, pervasive, and persistent. This 
might be particularly the case in contexts of recent or ongoing conflict and violence, and 
unresolved issues about who should be holding power. 
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One approach to addressing anti-accountability forces is to seek to build ‘countervailing 
power’ outside of governance institutions themselves; sources of demand for reform and 
accountability that incentivise and motivate the creation of new bargains and build broader 
social constituencies for change (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Fung and Wright 2003). Such an 
approach theorises that establishing these kinds of countervailing power can challenge more 
extractive, exclusive forms of governance, and hold in check or restrain the actions of those 
in authority. The underlying intervention logic is to empower relevant groups and individuals 
to make successful demands for change – whether better services, more equitable allocation 
of resources, or more inclusive decision-making.  
 
Whilst attempting to build countervailing power might be commonly recognised as the work 
of activists and movements, it is also well-established in the repertoire of interventions and 
imagined aims of international development donors in various ways. DFID is one example. 
Although this framing of donor aims is perhaps not commonplace, it is not unique. Gibson 
and Woolcock (2008) explore the extent to which large-scale participatory development 
programmes in Indonesia build countervailing power, and Fox (forthcoming) asks the same 
questions of a number of historic World Bank projects. It is a lens that we see as productive 
by focusing analytical attention on how power builds and is exercised, and whether 
accountability-aimed donor initiatives produce any shifts in these processes and relations 
(following McGee and Gaventa (2011) in understanding the potential for such shifts taking 
place as a result of actions targeting public accountability). DFID’s theory of change for its 
development programming on empowerment and accountability posits that increasing 
inclusivity of decision-making and broadening the political settlement to include wider state-
society bargains will lead to a range of political, social and economic benefits. These 
anticipated shifts in power are hoped to ultimately enable greater voice, choice and control 
for the poor and marginalised (DFID 2011c). This continues a trend in thinking from a 
substantial earlier policy paper on governance-related programmes, which set out aims of 
mutually supportive outcomes of state accountability, capability, and responsiveness in a 
framing that specifically understands this to involve shifts in political power away from narrow 
elites and the state (DFID 2007: 6). This latter theme was taken up in DFID’s major policy 
framework for fragile and conflict-affected settings, the Building Stability Framework, which 
introduced the language of ‘fair power structures’ and emphasised the contribution of ‘helping 
citizens’ voice to be heard, [and] ensuring authorities are accountable to those they serve’ 
(DFID 2016a: 14). Similar language is used in a recently published DFID position paper on 
governance programming, which also places substantial emphasis on the role of more 
inclusive and accountable governance in reducing or avoiding conflict (DFID 2019a: 7–8).  
 
Attempting to influence these issues of distribution of power and the behaviour of powerful 
actors and institutions from the position of an external donor is of course subject to much 
debate and complexity. There are arguments both around the legitimacy of such ambitions in 
themselves but also how effective any efforts might actually be. In more complex and 
conflictual settings, which present less predictable contexts, power relations are harder to 
read, and there is a greater risk of exacerbating rather than resolving conflicts. Justino (2019) 
notes that recent substantial donor investment in governance programmes in fragile and 
conflict-affected contexts is not backed by a strong evidence base. Whilst she finds 
supportive evidence for a number of common approaches, Justino concludes that the 
evidence base overall does not allow a fine-grained understanding of what works under 
different conditions. Christie and Burge (2017) review the evidence on the role of external 
actors specifically in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, also noting limited evidence 
behind what appear common practices. They do however find evidence for the efficacy of 
various approaches to empower civil society organisations to play greater roles in public 
discourse and social mobilisation, although less in relation to public accountability outcomes. 
One challenge here is the recognised difficulty in evaluating the impact of governance-
focused development programmes, which tend to have aims that are inherently complex to 
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assess, particularly in the relatively short timescales in which they are funded (Eyben et al. 
2015; Stern et al. 2012). 
 
External actors concerned with governance reform draw on a variety of commonly 
documented strategies. One is to try to put in place systems that increase local oversight of 
specific services, gathering evidence on quality of services, and increasing citizen voice on 
their priorities and experiences as users of these services. These approaches are often 
framed in terms of the concept of social accountability. Popularised in the early part of the 
last decade following the publication of the influential 2004 World Development Report 
(World Bank 2004), social accountability has been the subject of significant policy diffusion 
globally and has grown to be a key part of externally-funded development programmes    
(e-Pact 2016; Waddington et al. 2019). Joshi (2014) points out that various formations of 
social accountability appeal to different kinds of outcomes; from the more instrumental 
immediate fixes to service provision that come from better understanding service user needs, 
to more transformative changes in how citizens and the state relate to one another in terms 
of rights and responsibilities.  
 
Social accountability approaches can run alongside other common strategies that we can 
see as attempting to build countervailing power, which try to build institutions in civil society 
or within the state that have the potential to hold powerholders to account. Joshi and Moore 
(2000) distinguish these as attempts to work on ‘enabling environments’ rather than civic 
mobilisation. Within the state strategies can include strengthening formal oversight bodies 
such as ombuds agencies, audit bureaus or independent judicial review processes, or the 
ability of different levels and sections of government to challenge one another – often 
described as horizontal or diagonal accountability relationships (Goetz and Jenkins 2005). 
Within civil society they might involve supporting the growth of civic organisations and 
collectives that act to represent particular interests or constituencies, advocate for change, 
and build reformist movements and momentum. Positive outcomes of attempts at these 
kinds of support to civil society have been reported in independent reviews of DFID 
programmes (ICAI 2013a), in recent systematic reviews (Waddington et al. 2019), and 
internal reviews of international NGO programmes on civic involvement in governance in 
conflict-affected contexts (Amakom et al. 2018; Fooks 2013: 6).  
 
Although these strategies are well-established in the repertoire, evidence from evaluations 
and academic study is inconclusive on whether and in what contexts and scenarios they can 
generate sustained increases in government responsiveness and institutionalised 
improvements in the local accountability environment. This is in part arguably a result of the 
ways in which this evidence is gathered (Eyben et al. 2015; Holland et al. 2009; Stern et al. 
2012). Reviews of transparency-based and social accountability programmes repeatedly 
highlight the significance of a multitude of contextual factors (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015; 
O’Meally 2013; Tembo 2012) and caution realism in relation to how far such tools in and of 
themselves should be expected to shift power dynamics that sustain unresponsive 
governance (Fox 2007b; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Joshi 2013; Rocha Menocal and 
Sharma 2009). A DFID commissioned macro-evaluation of its empowerment and 
accountability programming ultimately focused largely on such social accountability 
initiatives. Using a Qualitative Comparative Analysis method, this concluded that such 
initiatives almost always led to service-level changes, but that systemic impacts were less 
observed (e-Pact 2016). The authors took this as evidence of ‘low accountability traps’ at 
local level, a term introduced by Fox (2007a) to refer to situations where institutions with 
weak vertical and horizontal accountability reinforce one another to limit the chances of 
accountability claims making it through the system. The macro-evaluation suggested that 
within the programmes reviewed, achieving higher-level policy changes through such 
approaches required the integration of citizens’ experiences within the formal institutionalised 
spaces of the service delivery and governance system, although this was not sufficient in the 
examples analysed to generate those changes in isolation. A recent systematic review of 
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evaluation evidence from a range of citizen engagement modalities, including those 
associated with social accountability approaches, drew a similar conclusion that localised 
improvements in services and relationships were common but these were not necessarily 
linked to evidenced improvements in what they termed ‘wellbeing’ outcomes (Waddington 
et al. 2019). 
 
Fox (2015) highlights that efforts to mobilise citizens or institutions to raise their voice and 
make louder demands for public accountability often fail to activate institutionalised or formal 
mechanisms that can effectively sanction decision makers – what he calls ‘voice without 
teeth’. Reviewing the treatment of evidence for social accountability initiatives, Fox 
introduces an important distinction between tactical and strategic approaches. Strategic 
approaches are defined as those that ‘deploy multiple tactics, encourage enabling 
environments for collective action for accountability, and coordinate citizen voice initiatives 
with reforms that bolster public sector responsiveness’ (Fox 2015: 346) and thereby have the 
potential to activate accountability across multiple sites within and outside of the state. This 
particular element of more strategic approaches was developed further by Fox and 
colleagues using the notion of ‘vertical integration’ in relation to service monitoring and 
advocacy efforts to analyse successful pro-accountability action in a number of contexts at 
multiple levels of government service delivery (Aceron 2018; Fox 2001, 2016; Fox et al. 
2016). The wider argument is that working in a multi-scalar way enables reformers to 
‘address the systemic embeddedness of anti-accountability forces across multiple levels and 
branches of a state apparatus’ (Fox 2016: 8).  
 
This conception of scale is distinct from the notion of ‘going to scale’ in the sense of doing 
more or broadening the impact of development activity. In usage here, scale specifically 
denotes multi-directional relationships between sites of governance or social and political 
action and decision-making.4 These connections or linkages might be vertical – connecting 
between the many layers of action from the very local to the national and international – or 
horizontal – across multiple physical localities, constituencies or sectors. Working with 
horizontal scale does not necessarily involve horizontal accountability, which refers more 
narrowly to the extent to which authorities and institutions at the same level act to hold one 
another to account (O’Donnell 1998). 
 
Working in this way is shown in the body of literature that emerged around this idea, to have 
various advantages that overcome the reportedly often isolated impacts of accountability 
initiatives. A number of reasons for this are explored. For one, it is suggested that 
approaching accountability deficits in a way that takes scale into account might allow ‘pro-
accountability actors… to target or bypass accountability bottlenecks’ to get issues resolved 
(Fox 2016: 13). It is also suggested, particularly in the cases identified in the Philippines by 
Aceron (2018), that a critical mass of evidence can be amassed to support reform, and that 
such connections enable national advocacy to be grounded in local service monitoring. At a 
wider level the theory suggests that adopting a multi-scalar strategy is important for building 
pro-reform constituencies and demand for accountability, and that cross-scalar linkages 
between different kinds of civil society actors and organisations might be important in 
creating pro-accountability constituencies with the depth and breadth to present a challenge 
to ingrained anti-accountability forces (Fox 2016). Accountability strategies that take scale 
into account thus involve coordinated activity at multiple levels, as well as planning how to 
broaden the social constituencies that can drive institutional change. Fox suggests that 
disconnects between organisations with ‘eyes and ears’ and felt social needs at a local level, 
and those undertaking national level policy advocacy hamper pro-accountability reform, and 
 
4  A discussion on these directions and kinds of multi-scalar effects and interactions can be found in a presentation 
developed during this project by Jonathan Fox, delivered to a project group of the International Budget Partnership in 
July 2018, and available online here: 
https://jonathanfoxucsc.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/taking_scale_into_account_ibp_spark_july_24_2018.pptx 
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that these disconnects are likely to be ‘especially relevant in fragile and conflict settings’ (Fox 
2016: 7).  
 
In later sections we explore how far a particular sample of DFID-funded programmes use 
strategies like these. First, we explain how we arrived at this sample, and studied the 
programmes’ activities. 
 
 
3  The project, methods, sources and 
limitations of evidence 
The findings presented here come from an extended period of research undertaken in 
several stages by a team from the Accountability Research Center and the Institute of 
Development Studies, as part of the Action for Empowerment and Accountability Research 
Programme (A4EA). Research activities were motivated by a recognition that in four of the 
five focus countries of the A4EA programme, DFID had invested substantially in programmes 
with explicit empowerment and accountability aims. Several of these, such as the SAVI 
programme in Nigeria, had been considered flagship activities in the governance sector. 
Under the broad line of enquiry within the A4EA programme exploring the role of external 
actors in generating empowerment and accountability outcomes, and informed by a 2016 
paper written for the programme on the importance of multi-scalar approaches (Fox 2016) 
we sought to explore: 
 
• The degree to which DFID country-level programmes in FCVAS are taking scale into 
account in their design, particularly through multi-level and vertically and/or horizontally 
integrated approaches.   
• The ‘theories of change’ the programmes were using or seeking to activate; how they 
envisaged their actions would lead to increased accountability in the short and long-
term. 
• How the programmes monitored and evaluated their use of multi-level and vertically 
integrated approaches. 
• What could be learnt about using and strengthening multi-level and vertically and/or 
horizontally integrated approaches in FCVAS from the delivery of these programmes. 
 
We explored these in a number of ways, including systematic review of documentary 
evidence, interviews with programme stakeholders in a series of short field visits to three 
countries, and a stakeholder event bringing together DFID staff, implementers of these kinds 
of programmes, and our research teams. These are outlined briefly here before a wider 
discussion on the extent of the evidence this approach has enabled us to gather and its 
limitations. 
 
3.1 Research approach 
We used publicly available information on DFID programmes in Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan to identify an initial set of activities for further exploration. We used 
official programme summaries from DFID’s public disclosure website ‘Development Tracker’ 
to identify programmes that were reported as seeking to promote outcomes of accountability, 
empowerment, participation or transparency, that had been active in these countries 
between 2011 and 2016. This date range was chosen on the assumption that more recently 
initiated programmes may not be sufficiently established to have generated evidence to 
review. From the 21 resulting programmes an initial review of documentation and 
discussions with experts in those contexts narrowed our focus to ten programmes. The most 
common exclusion factor was for programmes that had public accountability aims but 
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activities that focused largely on reforms of state institutions with limited activity engaging 
citizens directly. Two programmes were excluded as they had been completed some time 
before fieldwork. Various other exclusions were made for relevance; for example, the MUVA 
programme in Mozambique was excluded as although it sought to promote women’s 
empowerment it did not also have a focus on accountability. 
 
For this sample of ten programmes we then created a detailed database of programme 
documentation and evidence. Documents were gathered from the DFID aid transparency 
portal,5 the database previously created to support DFID’s macro-evaluation on voice and 
accountability programming (e-Pact 2016), the websites of those involved in delivering the 
programmes, and general searches for online material, including references to these 
programmes in academic publications. These were supplemented over time with the addition 
of documentation and other evidence from organisations implementing programme activities 
and contacts within DFID field offices. The research team undertook a structured review of 
the available documentation using variables based on the research objectives outlined 
above; for example, identifying expressions of the programme theory of change and noting 
how multi-scalar activity was included in the monitoring and evaluation schemes. This 
process of refinement and documentary review informed the selection of six programmes for 
further focus.  
Table 3.1 below illustrates the narrowing from the original sample to the programmes we 
focus on in this paper. 
 
Table 3.1 Programme case selection – indicating inclusion in documentary 
review and case study activities  
Country Programme (acronym or 
used name in brackets) 
Start 
year 
End 
year 
Budget 
(DFID) 
Doc. 
review 
Case 
study 
Exclusion 
reason 
Pakistan AAWAZ Voice and 
Accountability Programme 
2011 2018 £39m Yes Yes  
Consolidating Democracy in 
Pakistan 
2015 2019 £27m No No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
Empowerment, Voice and 
Accountability for Better 
Health and Nutrition         
(EVA-BHN) 
2012 2019 £18.9m Yes Yes  
Strengthening the Rule of Law 
in Pakistan 
2016 2020 £12m No No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
Supporting Transparency 
Accountability and Electoral 
Processes in Pakistan 
2010 2014 £11.7m No No Completed well 
before study 
period.  
Transforming Education in 
Pakistan (Alif Ailaan) 
2013 2018 £25.3m Yes Yes  
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
Education Sector Programme 
2011 2020 £264m No No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
 
(Cont’d.)  
 
5  www.devtracker.dfid.gov.uk  
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Table 3.1 (cont’d.) 
Nigeria Facility for Oil Sector 
Transformation II (FOSTER II) 
2015 2021 £19.5m Yes No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
Facility for Oil Sector 
Transparency (FOSTER) 
2010 2016 £13.2m Yes No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
Partnership to Engage, 
Reform, and Learn (PERL) 
2016 2021 £100m No No Studied 
separately in 
research 
programme 
State Accountability and 
Voice Initiative (SAVI) 
2008 2016 £33.8m Yes No Completed well 
before study 
period. 
Justice for All 2008 2017 £52m No No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
Mozambique Civil Society Support 
Mechanism 
2015 2018 £5m No No Focus on 
funding national 
level advocacy.   
Democratic Local Governance 
Support Programme (Diálogo) 
2012 2017 £9.6m Yes Yes  
Muva 2014 2022 £18m No No Focus on 
economic 
empowerment 
only. 
Strengthening Citizen 
Engagement in Mozambique 
(CEP) 
2012 2017 £10m Yes Yes  
Myanmar Burma Civil Society Support 
Programme (BCSSP) 
2011 2016 £13.6m Yes Yes  
Improving the management of 
public funds for the benefit of 
people in Burma 
2014 2019 £20m Yes No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
Programme for Democratic 
Change 
2014 2019 £24m No No Limited citizen-
focused activity 
Supporting Partnerships for 
Accountability and Civic 
Engagement in Myanmar 
(SPACE) 
2017 2021 £10.3m No No In inception 
phase, too early 
to review 
Supporting Peace-building in 
Burma 
2015 2020 £25.5m No No Largely 
investments in 
multi-donor 
initiatives. 
Source: DFID Development Tracker public disclosure website, except EVA-BHN programme, where financial data was drawn 
from a DFID-supported programme assessment (Taylor and Khan 2018) as EVA-BHN is a sub-component of the DFID 
programme, ‘Provincial Health and Nutrition in Pakistan’ and the budget is not disaggregated in programme documentation.  
Notes: Budgets indicate DFID contributions, which may be matched with other donor contributions in some cases to increase 
the overall spend. These budgets include often substantial sets of activity not discussed in this paper given our specific focus on 
multi-scalar strategies. 
 
Supplementing our documentary review, brief periods of fieldwork on the six case study 
programmes took place in Pakistan (December 2017), Mozambique (June 2018), and 
Myanmar (June 2018). Researchers interviewed DFID field office staff, practitioners involved 
in delivering programme activities, wider stakeholders in the development sector, and in 
Pakistan some project beneficiaries in the form of local community forums. Interviews sought 
to understand the context and contextual fit of the programmes and their multi-level 
approaches, the perceived successes and challenges of these approaches, and views on 
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their outcomes. These discussions did not seek to evaluate the programme activities in the 
sense of evidencing outcomes or their attribution to particular activities, but instead to 
provide additional evidence and insights into how multi-scalar strategies had operated in 
practice. A report from the first period of fieldwork (Esser 2018), comparing the case study 
programmes in Pakistan, was developed to inform the subsequent visits and interviews. 
There were differences in project status in each country. In Pakistan all the programmes 
explored in fieldwork were currently operational to differing degrees, although two were in 
their final stages. In Mozambique the two programmes chosen had closed almost six months 
previously and a new programme based on those experiences was under design. In 
Myanmar the study focused on activities under a programme that had concluded more than a 
year earlier, but some components of the work were continuing under a new programme with 
similar stakeholders and implementing organisations.  
 
Findings from documentary review and fieldwork studies were shared with an audience of 
DFID staff and programme practitioners in an IDS workshop in July 2018 that aimed to 
further explore how our selected programmes and others like them worked in practice, and to 
test findings so far. The audience included several practitioners who had been employed in 
or involved in the design or evaluation of the specific programmes we studied. Alongside 
discussion of initial findings, the workshop provided wider opportunities for practitioners to 
reflect on trends in development programming of this kind and discuss challenges and 
learning from that programming from their own perspectives. 
 
3.2 Availability of evidence    
DFID considers aid transparency a high policy priority (DFID 2018b) and provides a specific 
online portal designed to increase the transparency of UK development assistance. 
However, we found significant variation in the quantity and quality of project information that 
we were able to gather directly through this portal to support our documentary review. We 
explore here what information we could gather and how informative generally we found that 
material. 
 
In DFID programme management practice, the business case sets out the strategic reasons 
for proposed activities, the aims of activities, and the approach to delivery. At the point at 
which data was originally gathered, two of the ten programmes did not have a published 
business case, although all became available during the study. Business cases available 
were on the whole informative and helped understanding of both the rationale and design of 
the programme concerned. Six of the programmes had some form of original contract 
documentation published after this initial business case, which often showed how the original 
aims were translated into a refined set of activities. All programmes had some annual 
reviews of programme performance published, but for many this did not cover all of the years 
of operation. There was only one programme that did not have a published results framework 
or logical framework document setting out how programme outcomes were measured. 
However, in many cases these were not recently updated. Four of the seven programmes 
that had finished had a programme completion review available online, two of which became 
available during the research process, and one was published online a year after the 
programme had reportedly ended. None of the five completed programmes had final 
evaluations available on the portal, and only one programme had an independent mid-term 
review available as of September 2019. During the course of our research we acquired a 
range of other official documentation from programme managers and implementers. A 
summary of document availability is presented in Table 3.2, where shaded boxes indicate 
availability at the time of the document review, with an ‘x’ indicating where these were shared 
with us but are not publicly available. 
  
With very few exceptions the transparency portal only includes documentation ‘owned’ by 
DFID. Programme implementers had often generated much more extensive documentation, 
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which DFID field offices had access to. For example, whilst the portal makes available the 
Annual Reviews of programme activity these contain much less detail than the annual 
reports that programme providers submit to DFID. This is of particular interest from a 
research perspective as these annual reports often revealed data and regularly collected 
metrics on project performance that were not included in the DFID Annual Reviews. Notably, 
very few of these documents were available on the programme websites, where these 
existed. In fact, provider organisations generally published even less material about the work 
of particular programmes online than DFID.  
 
Table 3.2 Availability of DFID programme documentation 
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AAWAZ  X 
 
X 
  
X 
 
ALIF-AILAAN  
     
X 
 
EVA-BHN  
     
n/a n/a 
FOSTER 
       
FOSTER II  
     
n/a n/a 
SAVI  
       
CEP  
   
X 
  
X 
DIÁLOGO   
  
X X 
  
X 
BCSSP  
   
X 
   
IPFPB  
     
n/a n/a 
Source: Authors’ own analysis as at September 2018, building on work by Suchi Pande, based on available documentation on 
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk  
Note: Shaded boxes indicate documents that we could review. Those marked X were not publicly available. 
Unshaded boxes indicate documents that could not be reviewed, with n/a noting where this document would not 
have been expected to be available as programmes were ongoing at the time of study. 
 
We found that documentation varied significantly in detail and quality of explanation and 
discussion – in particular, Annual Reviews. Project Completion Reviews were more 
consistent in their quality of reflection on activities, their outcomes, and the evidence for their 
judgements. The greatest difficulty in using this documentary material came where the 
activities we wanted to study were part of a larger and more diverse DFID programme. It is 
fairly common for programmes to have multiple components, but those with fewer and more 
directly aligned activities were easier to assess from the official documentation. The greatest 
impact of this was for the EVA-BHN project in Pakistan, which was a component of a much 
larger health sector support programme and was covered fairly minimally in reports on that 
programme.    
 
A final point on availability of evidence relates to programme evaluation specifically. DFID 
practice appears to be to publish programme evaluations not on the pages for each 
programme on the transparency portal, but in a series of separate web pages that are 
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published annually.6 Two final evaluations commissioned by DFID were made available to us 
by DFID field offices, and at the time of writing these had also not been published on either 
the transparency portal or the evaluation collection webpage. One programme was reported 
by the DFID field office to have an evaluation completed but this was not made available 
(although an independent mid-term assessment of this programme was shared). One DFID-
commissioned independent assessment of a programme, not presented as an evaluation, 
became publicly available during our study (Taylor and Khan 2017), and is available online 
(although it was not added to the transparency portal or the evaluation collection webpage). 
Four programmes that had completed or were near completion did not appear to have 
independent evaluations undertaken or ongoing. This overall coverage of programme level 
evaluation supports the finding of the comprehensive review of DFID empowerment and 
accountability programmes undertaken in 2016, which worked with a sample of 50 
programmes in depth, and concluded that the availability of evaluations was rare for these 
programmes (e-Pact 2016: 20). The direct implication of this is that our analysis in the later 
sections of this paper rely for some programmes on internally produced documentation and 
reports from local practitioners and stakeholders, rather than on evidence that has been 
more independently validated.  
 
In contrast to the volume of suitable evidence on programme activities available publicly and 
in DFID documentation, during our fieldwork we were provided with evidence of and told 
about significant and sophisticated monitoring systems used by programme implementers. 
We comment further on this gap between programme internal and external evidence 
generation in Section 8 of the paper, which also discusses the implications of patchy 
available evidence and what this means in terms of learning from this significant set of DFID-
supported activities. First, however, we introduce the case study programmes, and look at 
what this evidence does enable us to say about their similarities in design and practice. 
 
 
4  The case study programmes 
The programmes we focused on all had explicit empowerment and accountability aims in 
contexts characterised by fragility, violence, and conflict. Some were explicitly governance-
focused programmes whilst others sought to generate improvements in specific sectors or for 
specific groups. Four programmes were completing their work during the research period, 
one was completed some time before, and one was continuing. They had a combined 
investment from DFID of £116 million, and were all planned as at least five year 
programmes.  
 
Table 4.1 below summarises these factors. Before moving to comparisons, the rest of this 
section gives a brief introduction to each programme, outlining the context in which they were 
developed, their general aims, activities, and reported outcomes drawing from programme 
documentation and available evaluations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6  See, for example, the following page with evaluations completed in 2017–18: 
www.gov.uk/government/collections/evaluations-completed-april-2017-to-march-2018--2  
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Table 4.1 Case study programmes 
Acronym/ 
used name 
Programme name Country  Duration Budget 
(DFID) 
Main sectors  
AAWAZ AAWAZ Voice and 
Accountability Programme 
Pakistan 2011–18 £39m Governance; Gender; 
Conflict 
Alif Ailaan Transforming Education in 
Pakistan 
Pakistan 2013–18 £25.3m Education 
EVA-BHN Empowerment, Voice and 
Accountability for Better 
Health and Nutrition 
Pakistan 2012–19 £18.9m Health 
CEP Citizen Engagement 
Programme 
Mozambique 2012–17 £10m Education; Health 
Diálogo Democratic Local 
Governance Support 
Programme 
Mozambique 2012–17 £9.6m Governance 
BCSSP Burma Civil Society 
Support Programme 
Myanmar 2011–16 £13.6m Governance 
 
 
4.1 AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme – Pakistan – 2011–18 
Pakistan’s ‘largest demand-side voice and accountability programme’ according to DFID 
documentation, (DFID 2018c: 1), AAWAZ operated in the two provinces of Punjab and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and was nearing completion during our fieldwork. AAWAZ built a multi-
level network of spaces and opportunities for citizens to engage together and with officials 
and service providers. It used a variety of approaches that sought to empower previously 
marginalised people to raise demands and engage in governance decision-making, with a 
particular focus on women. Activity included widespread training, information provision, and 
maintaining local centres where people could connect, including a network of more than 400 
‘Aagahi Centres’, which were reportedly accessed by 100,000 women and girls during the life 
of the programme (DFID 2018c: 15). These were complemented by a deliberate strategy of 
establishing spaces for programme participants to engage with officials, including a reported 
2,200 open town hall meetings and meetings of district-level committees (DFID 2018c: 16). 
 
The DFID programme completion review reported positively on the outcomes of AAWAZ, 
suggesting that it ‘provided a robust citizen-state interface where government officials and 
elected representatives were held accountable to women and the socially excluded’ (DFID 
2018c: 1). It reports that more than 27,000 improvements in services were made in response 
to community level demands (DFID 2018c: 17), that 159 instances of policy and 
implementation changes that came about could be attributed to the activities (DFID 2018c: 
16), and that six pieces of provincial legislation were directly influenced by the programme 
(DFID 2018c: 17). At completion positive improvements were also reported in terms of 
citizens’ capacities and willingness to challenge restrictive gender norms and hold the state 
to account on an ongoing basis (DFID 2018c: 22).  
 
4.2 Alif Ailaan – Pakistan – 2013–18 
Alif Ailaan (‘Education Declaration’) was the major component of the DFID programme, 
Transforming Education in Pakistan. Presented as a political campaign it sought to increase 
pressure on politicians and service providers to improve education services and outcomes 
through establishing a broad-based coalition that could ‘galvanise political will’ at various 
levels of government to see through reforms (DFID 2017b: 1). The explicit focus on 
incentivising and holding accountable political power-holders was seen as a novel approach 
in the context of other donor-funded accountability activities in Pakistan focusing on 
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generating direct community level engagement with service providers, rather than politicians 
(DFID 2017c: 8). Alif Ailaan identified and provided funding to local organisations to play 
different roles in campaign-building, and sought to catalyse activism through provision of 
information and guidance and recruitment of campaign mobilisers in what it called a 
‘movement building’ strategy (DFID 2017b: 1). It also undertook detailed studies of the 
education system combining existing government data and new research, increasing the 
evidence of education system performance and disparities. Another key approach was 
maintaining a high media presence, often sharing these data with a ‘naming and shaming’ 
intention in traditional and social media. 
 
The DFID programme completion review claims that the campaign ‘catalysed increased 
government investment in education at the federal and provincial level and ensured reform 
continued and was prioritised by the next government’ (DFID 2018f: 1). Esser found many 
supporters of its approach amongst practitioners involved in empowerment and 
accountability programmes in Pakistan, and argued that the programme held ‘considerable 
promise in terms of creating lasting change, not only regarding education outcomes but also 
more broadly to forge greater accountability’ (Esser 2018: 18).  
 
4.3 Empowerment Voice and Accountability for Better Health and Nutrition– 
Pakistan – 2012–19 
EVA-BHN was part of the broader Provincial Health and Nutrition Programme (PHNP) that 
aimed to improve reproductive, maternal and nutrition health outcomes in the two provinces 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Punjab in Pakistan. EVA-BHN was explicitly presented as 
the ‘demand-side’ element of a programme that was otherwise largely acting to build 
technical and delivery capacity in public services. EVA-BHN sought ‘to empower, organise 
and facilitate citizens and civil society to hold duty-bearers in Punjab and KP to account’ for 
service provision (Palladium 2016a: 4). The programme supported nearly 400 community-
level groups at Union Council level in nine districts, that had engaged almost 40,000 people 
by September 2017 (DFID 2018a: 9). The groups served as the focal point for engaging 
people in rights education and advocacy training, as well as spaces for collective deliberation 
and to raise and prioritise issues drawn from citizen-based monitoring activities. New 
dialogue forums with service providers and other local leaders were established at district 
and provincial levels to complement this facility-level activity. EVA-BHN also worked on 
public communication activities intended to improve health-seeking behaviour.  
 
An independent assessment held near the end of the programme found evidence that the 
activities had contributed to better service provision and issue resolution at a local level, and 
better ‘cross-party dialogue and collaboration’ and responsiveness to citizen experience at 
the district level (Taylor and Khan 2017: 9;13). A separate study of the programme 
undertaken at the request of the implementing team and published by the A4EA programme, 
established how it had deployed multiple tactics at different levels in ways that illustrate more 
strategic approaches to social accountability (Kirk 2017). Impact studies produced by the 
programme itself highlight diverse pathways of activism and influence that led to issues being 
resolved beyond the immediate local health centre (Esser 2018). Various broader policy and 
practice outcomes of the work were reported (Palladium 2017: 18). These were confirmed to 
a degree by the independent assessment, although this also expressed concerns about how 
far the activities addressed the systemic challenges in the Pakistan health sector (Taylor and 
Khan 2017: 24, vi). 
 
4.4 Citizen Engagement Programme – Mozambique – 2012–17 
The Citizen Engagement Programme (CEP) was established with the rationale that central 
technical reforms and additional financing were insufficient to generate improved public 
services in Mozambique, and that strategies to increase citizen demand were needed. It 
worked specifically in the education and health sectors promoting the use of social 
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accountability tools and ‘co-governance’ arrangements that involved community members in 
the management and oversight of local schools and health facilities. These arrangements 
already existed in theory, but the programme aimed to demonstrate how they could work 
more effectively and inclusively through links with participatory community engagement. The 
activity covered four of the 11 Mozambican provinces and within these: 119 primary schools, 
12 secondary schools, 34 health posts, and 2 district hospitals (DFID 2018d: 4). Through a 
network of district civil society partners, community members were trained as facilitators of 
citizen engagement processes. These processes were supported by programme 
management staff at the provincial level, and national civil society advocacy partners in the 
education and health sectors. Mechanisms were created to aggregate and analyse the kinds 
of issues raised at the local level with the aim of influencing national policy. 
 
At the end of the programme, 56 per cent of schools and 65 per cent of health facilities 
engaged were judged to have made changes directly linked to citizen monitoring (DFID 
2018d: 7). A detailed programme evaluation found these largely to result from local 
adjustments, ‘galvanised’ co-management practices, and community contributions rather 
than systemic changes (Brook et al. 2017: vi). Evaluation and programme final reporting also 
described national level policy gains based on the evidence from the activity and the ‘proof of 
concept’ of citizen-based monitoring and service co-governance (Brook et al. 2017: 28–33). 
 
4.5 Diálogo (Democratic Governance Support Programme) – Mozambique – 
2012–17 
The Diálogo programme aimed at improving citizen-state relationships and interactions in 
Mozambican urban governance, focusing on municipal governance institutions. Part of the 
rationale for this focus was that efforts to increase accountability in central government 
institutions had demonstrated little impact (DFID 2012b: 1). Working in five specific urban 
centres, it worked with local civil society actors, elected politicians, and officials to test out 
approaches to participatory governance and establish more civic deliberation and 
independent oversight. Mechanisms adopted included participatory budgeting, citizen score-
card processes, participatory approaches to wider municipal planning, and public 
engagement with particular services and decisions. The programme also supported civil 
society organisations to build their capacity to participate in decision-making and facilitate 
wider community participation, and developed rights and governance awareness training for 
target communities. Alongside these, ran activities supporting independent media outlets to 
prompt public dialogue on issues of local governance.  
 
The external evaluation of the programme found significant impacts on the capacities of 
citizens to act on increased understanding of their rights and greater openness towards, and 
capacity to undertake, participatory governance approaches in the municipalities involved 
(Shankland et al. 2017: 4). The programme completion review reports that the activities 
‘strengthened voice and accountability by transforming the institutions and power relations in 
each of the five municipalities’ (DFID 2018e: 8). The role played in this by more empowered 
civic organisations, and constructive engagement with reformists in local governance was 
particularly emphasised. 
 
4.6 Burma Civil Society Strengthening Programme – Myanmar – 2011–16 
The Burma Civil Society Strengthening Programme (BCSSP) was developed in 2010 as 
Myanmar was undergoing a slow transition from military to elected civilian rule. Responding 
to a perceived fragmentation and lack of cohesion within civil society (DFID 2011b: 1), the 
programme funded a number of different kinds of support to build the capacity of civil society 
groups so that they would be more effective advocates for reform (DFID 2011b: 8). The 
programme focused largely on establishing the role of civil society organisations within the 
accountability eco-system, and creating ‘enabling environment’ conditions for their future 
engagement in policy reform. A number of projects were funded under the programme, 
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delivered by different organisations and with different contributions to the overall theory of 
change and action. These included organisational development support and core funding to 
a group of national-level organisations, and investment in social infrastructure to provide 
tailored capacity and network-building through the organisation Paung Ku (‘Bridging’). One of 
the projects, Pyoe Pin (‘Green Shoots’), worked specifically to form and financially support 
issue-based coalitions across civil society and government based on analysis of relatively 
more open policy spaces and tractable reform issues, and has been seen as an exemplar for 
politically-informed development programmes (Christie and Green 2018).  
 
Programme documentation references many legislative gains and institutional behaviour 
changes arising from CSO-led policy advocacy (British Council 2016a; DFID 2016b: 2). The 
programme completion review found that Pyoe Pin activity specifically facilitated stronger 
engagement between local civil society actors and policy processes (DFID 2016b: 10) and 
credited the ability of some of the civil society coalitions formed to ‘critically engage’ with 
government (DFID 2016b: 2). However this review also noted the difficulty in evidencing the 
contributions of the activities to policy changes given the rapid and to some degree 
unanticipated opening of civic space associated with changing political configurations during 
the programme delivery, and inconsistent outcome measurement (DFID 2016b: 22). 
 
These brief descriptions highlight the different histories, contexts and activities of the 
programmes chosen as case studies, most of which were operating simultaneously across 
our three countries of focus. A number of similarities also emerge. The next two sections look 
at these similarities in more depth, first in terms of their rationales, logics, and contextual 
analyses, and then in their adoption of similar multi-scalar strategies. 
 
 
5  What were the programmes trying to do, 
and why? 
Whilst the contexts and political economies in which these programmes were working 
differed both nationally and sub-nationally there were clear similarities in how their 
underpinning analyses portrayed the background conditions for public accountability. The 
programmes all acknowledged multi-scalar dynamics and responded to these in part in their 
design. They also showed similar theories of change and drew from similar repertoires of 
intervention.  
 
5.1 Diagnoses of accountability conditions  
The case study programmes shared several common diagnoses of the drivers of low state 
accountability. Key amongst these is a view of fairly limited organised citizen demand for 
better services and claims for accountability. For example, the Diálogo business case argues 
this is a ‘major barrier to increasing accountability’ (DFID 2012b: 11), whilst the rationale for 
the EVA-BHN set of activities calls existing citizen demand ‘ineffective’ (DFID 2012c: 7). The 
BCSSP business case explains the need for a ‘more active citizenry’ to take advantage of 
the transition to democracy in Myanmar (DFID 2011b: 4). Various reasons for this lack of 
citizen demand are given. One is the exclusion of many people from governance processes. 
For example the AAWAZ business case argues that ‘the social exclusion of the majority of 
the population from politics and governance must be addressed’ in order for Pakistan to 
achieve global development goals (DFID 2011a: 4). In common with the business case for 
Alif Ailaan, it argues this results in the absence of a social contract between government and 
citizens (DFID 2011a: 5, 2012d: 11). All programme designs note a particular exclusion of 
women from accountability processes. This is explained in part through references to social 
norms that ‘restrict access to the public arena’ (DFID 2012a: 6), low priority placed on 
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women’s experiences and wellbeing (DFID 2012c: 5), and underlying gender-based 
discrimination that is expressed in a lack of access to economic as well as political resources 
(DFID 2011b: 3).  
 
Another common diagnosis is of distance between citizen, activists, and reformers at 
different levels. For example the CEP business case noted ‘limited linkages between national 
[civil society] organisations and those representing or comprised of local interest groups, and 
between ‘professionalised’ groups and membership organisations’ (DFID 2012a: 5). The 
BCCSP business case goes into some detail on what it calls the ‘fragmentation’ of existing 
civic associations, CSOs, and NGOs (DFID 2011b: 4–5). In analysing the extent of civic 
space, the role of the media in maintaining public scrutiny and deliberation were often 
covered. For example the Diálogo programme, which made strengthening independent 
media a significant component of its work, analyses in some depth the need to incentivise 
investigative journalism linked to citizens’ concerns in Mozambique (DFID 2012b: 6). Alif 
Ailaan, also with a strong media component to its work, notes existing signs that some 
sections of the media in Pakistan are able to play a campaigning role with some influence 
(DFID 2012d: 8–9).  
 
Finally, most of the business cases note significant resource and technical constraints on 
public services. The EVA-BHN business case notes the risk of ‘demand outstripping supply’ 
should changes not also be funded and supported within services (DFID 2012c: 12). This is 
fitting for a mixed intervention working both with service providers and to surface community-
level priorities. In some contrast to this, the lack of success of previous reform efforts that 
focused only on ‘supply-side’ measures is mentioned in making the case for Diálogo (DFID 
2012b: 1) and EVA-BHN’s focus on building and facilitating citizen demand (DFID 2012c: 7). 
Documents relating to the design of AAWAZ state that ‘efforts to bring about change by 
focusing exclusively on supply-side governance have largely failed’ (DAI 2015: 3). 
 
5.2 Multi-scalar and multi-sited governance 
All of the programmes reviewed acknowledged a multi-scalar governance landscape in some 
way in their analysis and design. It was common for them to discuss the different ‘levels’ at 
which programmes would need to work, often focusing on the political-administrative 
hierarchy in that context. The business case for AAWAZ notes that ‘[e]xcluded groups, 
including women, will need to feel safe enough to become organised and involved in politics, 
local affairs and governance processes at all levels (community, district, province, nation)’ 
(DFID 2011a: 10). Design options for CEP were assessed for their ability to empower 
citizens ‘to dialogue with service providers and the state at different levels..’ (DFID 2012a: 6). 
The BCCSP business case placed a particular focus on the need for activity to build both 
vertical and horizontal linkages amongst civil society actors, with these being key criteria for 
selecting a programme design (DFID 2011b: 12).  
 
There is some discussion in the programme documents on where power lies across these 
levels and different actors. This involves some apparent contradictions; emphasising both 
centralisation and concentration of official decision-making, and simultaneously the informally 
important role of a wide range of fairly dispersed actors and institutions. Highly concentrated 
formal decision-making at the national government level is highlighted in business cases for 
Mozambique (DFID 2012a: 11, 2012b: 8), in the mid-term evaluation of the BCSSP in 
Myanmar (DFID 2013a: 46), and in documentation of the EVA-BHN approach in Pakistan 
(Palladium 2016a: 7), although in this case power is seen as centralised at provincial level in 
Punjab. The business case for Diálogo not only notes the dominantly centralised decision-
making in Mozambique but emphasises this as part of a rationale for attempting to develop 
better governance practices at municipal level (DFID 2012b: 8). At the same time, a common 
diagnosis is that low citizen engagement with the state is driven by patronage-based 
governance (DFID 2011a: 9, 2012a: 2, 2012d: 9), informal power-holders and institutions 
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such as local elites and political intermediaries such as party brokers (DFID 2011a: 9, 2012a: 
4; Palladium 2016b: 6), and the role of the military (DFID 2011a: 9, 2011b: 1). The Alif Ailaan 
business case particularly highlights the role of military elites in resource control (DFID 
2012d: 7). Both Mozambican programmes note in particular the blurred boundaries between 
the ruling party and the state, which is seen to undermine opportunities for citizen 
participation, and the sensitivity of the party to any criticism, which is typically framed as 
support for the political opposition (DFID 2012a: 4, 2012b: 6-7).   
 
5.3 Theories of change and intervention 
Programme design documents consistently view more inclusive governance developing over 
time through the building of countervailing power outside of existing institutions and elites. In 
keeping with the language of the DFID over-arching theory of change for governance 
programmes (DFID 2011c), programme analyses often use the notion of political settlements 
existing in which ordinary people hold little sway over governance decisions. Programme 
rationales posit the possibility for donor-supported action that can support a broadening of 
the political settlement, most notably through a more empowered citizenry that might shift 
incentives or challenge the status quo. The BCCSP business case argues that whilst change 
in the political settlement will ultimately ‘come from within’, the programme can ‘equip 
organisations and coalitions with the capacity to work towards a more plural and democratic 
society’ where opportunities arise (DFID 2011b: 8). The programme completion review of the 
AAWAZ programme for example credits it with ‘breaking state monopoly of ‘official executive 
oversight’’ (DFID 2018c: 23).  
 
A number of strategies for citizen empowerment are covered in the common repertoires of 
the programmes. These include activities designed to raise awareness of rights and 
entitlements (AAWAZ, CEP, Diálogo and EVA-BHN in particular), development of spaces 
and structures for deliberation and discussion of preferences and to agree collective 
strategies, and creation of structures or opportunities to channel and legitimate expressions 
of individual and collective agency. This latter point is important given the histories of 
repression and violence by state actors, and the need to provide ‘safe’ avenues through 
which grievances and demands might be raised. The outcomes anticipated of this more 
empowered citizenry are described in terms of improved services, increased access to 
services and entitlements, and in terms of better citizen-state relationships. For example, the 
DFID Terms of Reference for the EVA-BHN programme posits that ‘through greater pressure 
and demand from… citizens’ the programme would be able to ‘influence health legislation, 
policy, practices, and service delivery’ (DFID 2014: 2). The Diálogo business case imagines 
that through support to local groups and municipalities ‘women, young people, and men will 
increasingly participate in a meaningful way in the decision-making and political processes at 
a local level’ (DFID 2012b: 3). Most ambitiously perhaps, the BCSSP business case posits 
that ‘the more that people and organisations work together, in constructive ways, to achieve 
tangible changes, the more they will strengthen the role of citizens in building a functioning 
democracy’ (DFID 2011b: 3-4). 
 
 
6  What multi-scalar strategies were used? 
Having established a core of similar diagnoses and underlying logics, we now move to 
explore how programme activities responded to the recognition of multi-level governance and 
the importance of scale. Three distinct uses of multi-scalar strategies were distinguishable in 
the case study programmes:  
 
• Direct vertical aggregation of citizen demands and claims on authorities. 
Establishing mechanisms to formulate and gather citizens’ preferences, priorities and 
experiences and convey these upward to those responsible for public services.   
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• Building vertical integration of civil society organisations and campaigns. 
Undertaking activities that linked civic action and organisations at the grassroots with 
sub-national and national level civil society activism and lobbying. 
• Developing horizontal linkages and networks. Incentivising and creating conditions 
for organisations and reformists working across geographies or sectors to find common 
ground and act jointly. 
 
These have different logics that may be complementary but may also involve some trade-offs 
in terms of where to direct effort. Some programmes involved aspects of all three, whilst 
some focused more on one than others. Table 6.1 below illustrates our analysis of this, which 
suggests that programmes each had a dominant focus on one of the three strategies.  
 
The remainder of this section discusses each strategy in turn, illustrating their uses within the 
case study programmes, and highlighting some key characteristics. It is important to note 
that all of the programmes we looked at include significant other components or repertoires 
of intervention – either integrated into the work that we focus on in this paper or in distinct 
projects. They all sought to work to some degree on wider aspects of the enabling 
environment for accountability claims from citizens, for instance. These include seeking to 
hold or expand civil society space, incentivise public media reporting that is pro-
accountability, in one case working with religious leaders, and also developing knowledge 
and skills amongst citizens in terms of rights and rights-claiming. In many cases they sought 
to marry their work on citizen empowerment, mobilisation, and action with action to build 
state or service capacity to respond more fully to the citizen demands. In the following 
analysis we refer to these only where these activities were multi-scalar in nature.  
 
Table 6.1 Use of multi-scalar strategies in case study programmes 
 Role of identified multi-scalar strategies 
Programme 
Vertical aggregation of 
citizen demands 
Vertical integration of 
CSOs and campaigns 
Horizontal linkages and 
networks 
AAWAZ Major Minor Minor 
Alif Ailaan  Major Minor 
BCSSP  Major Minor 
CEP Major Minor Minor 
Diálogo  Minor Major 
EVA-BHN Major  Minor 
Source: Authors’ assessment 
 
6.1 Direct vertical integration of citizen demands and claims on authorities 
In three of the programmes we reviewed a defining characteristic of their design involved 
strategies of mobilising people around specific local needs and public service delivery quality 
and aggregating these issues or demands vertically. To different degrees and in different 
combinations the AAWAZ, EVA-BHN, and CEP programmes all attempted to vertically 
integrate versions of common social accountability tools: community score cards, citizen-
based monitoring, public hearings or ‘town hall’ meetings, and ‘co-management’ mechanisms 
like school management committees. The programmes saw these structured multi-level 
processes as a way to get beyond the most local of issues and bring evidence and challenge 
to decision makers elsewhere in the system. This is important given the whole range of 
decisions that are beyond the power of frontline service delivery units and personnel, the 
systemic causes that lie behind many service deficiencies, and problems that have their root 
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in overall public investment in services. They designed and operated their multi-level 
processes in different ways. 
 
The activities of EVA-BHN responded deliberately to the scholarly evidence base on social 
accountability (Kirk 2017; Palladium 2016b) and structured vertical integration of demands 
and citizen-based monitoring evidence was a ‘defining component’ of the programme (Esser 
2018: 16). The vertical structure of citizen-led groups it built mirrored local governance 
decision-making structures in Pakistan, and the direct involvement of citizen representatives 
at multiple levels was a distinctive part of the programme implementation. Union-council level 
groups were used to surface and explore experiences of using primary health services and 
highlight issues to be addressed or specific grievances, with people from these groups taking 
these to local health providers. District-level advocacy forums brought those participating 
together with higher level health sector decision makers and wider civil society 
representatives, and were used to both review the general patterns of issues coming up at 
the Union Council level and to raise specific problems or demands that were not able to be 
resolved locally. Sometimes these were issues that were not in the power of local services to 
resolve – for example allocation of equipment of staff. In other cases, they were issues with 
local providers and staff who were not being responsive to community feedback – for 
example staff not following procedures or providing poor quality care. This ‘demand 
escalation’ model was found in an independent assessment to have had good effect in many 
cases, with district authorities able to step in to support changes (Taylor and Khan 2017: 13–
14). The programme also convened provincial-level advocacy forums that engaged 
authorities and influential political figures. These discussed the pattern of demands arising 
from communities, attempted to draw attention to both the structural issues in the health 
system that underpinned these, and promoted the value of citizen or service user feedback in 
generating greater service responsiveness.  
 
AAWAZ worked in the same provinces of Pakistan. Facilitated by local NGOs the programme 
established a multi-level set of groups that in design took a ‘deliberately cross-scalar’ 
approach (Esser 2018:14). A broad base of women’s community centres and youth groups 
provided spaces for citizens ‘to formulate priorities and voice resulting demands’ (Esser 
2018: 14). Issues and demands from these groups were raised and discussed in district and 
provincial level fora with government representatives including in ‘town hall’ meetings, in a 
model reportedly designed to ‘aggregate and escalate’ issues to ‘higher tiers of government’ 
(DAI 2015: 6). DFID programme documentation reports that nearly 30,000 ‘demands’ were 
raised with public officials as a result of these activities and that the programme used 
provincial forums to ‘tangibly influence’ provincial legislation (DFID 2018c: 17). There is little 
illustration or evidence in programme documentation however of how these changes and the 
demand aggregation system were linked, and how and by whom representations to decision 
makers were made. In our fieldwork some local practitioners expressed scepticism about the 
ways that these volumes of activity were measured, documented and incentivised (Esser 
2018: 16), but confirmed that the programme operated in a clear vertically articulated way – 
noting that the programme was ‘trying to form a vertical structure… by creating local 
councils, then sending people upward’ (Esser 2018: 14).  
 
CEP focused on citizen demands regarding health and education services in rural 
Mozambique. Activities at a ‘facility’ level – mostly primary schools and primary health 
centres – used community score cards and to a lesser extent citizen report cards to feed into 
what the programme termed ‘co-governance’ arrangements; school and health centre 
committees that were mandated in some way to have community involvement. The findings 
of community level scorecards and prioritisation were collated and aggregated upwards by 
the CSOs that led on delivering the programme at a local level to district and provincial 
levels. Through engagement and funding of established national civil society advocacy 
groups in each sector, with access to a database established of issues raised in facility-level 
scorecards, this evidence was then fed into national policy debates. An independent 
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evaluation of the programme confirmed that the programme generated numerous ‘facility-
level improvements’ but attributed these largely to the connections between community 
scorecards processes and the co-governance mechanisms that allowed the outcomes to be 
prioritised in facility-level planning (Brook et al. 2017: vi). It concluded that the programme 
had struggled with a ‘lack of vertical responsiveness’ to demands taken to the district and 
provincial levels (Brook et al. 2017: v). 
 
6.2 Building vertical integration of civil society, campaigns and reform 
coalitions 
In addition to working directly with state or other decision-makers, several of the case study 
programmes used multi-level approaches in establishing or strengthening vertical networks 
of civil society organisations and advocacy campaigns. This was an important strategy in the 
activities of the BCSSP in Myanmar and the Alif Ailaan programme in Pakistan. It was less 
central but also used in the approach of CEP in Mozambique and AWAAZ in Pakistan. These 
activities aligned with programme diagnoses of ‘fragmented’ or ‘piece-meal’ initiatives and 
activism by civil society organisations (DFID 2011b: 8,10, 2012a: 11, 2012d: 27).  
 
Positioned overtly as a campaign with movement building and advocacy logics at its core, 
the design of the Alif Ailaan programme recognised the need to connect constituencies 
vertically to generate the kinds of pressure across the education system that might stimulate 
change (DFID 2012d: 7, 21, 27). The campaign approach sought to catalyse popular 
demand for better public education, rather than specific localised changes in particular 
schools noted to be achieved by previous targeted social accountability activities (DFID 
2017c: 8). Alongside support to activists and direct lobbying activities, the programme 
worked extensively on generation and packaging of spatially disaggregated data on the 
education system. Whilst much of this work used government produced data, which Esser 
(2018: 17) argues ‘shielded’ it from political criticism to a degree, the campaign also funded 
new research to counterpoise official data. For example, a 2015 study of one province 
showed that a high number of officially listed schools in one district were not in fact open (Alif 
Ailaan 2015). Evidence from this data analysis was shared with a network of activists 
engaged at various levels and used in media campaigns and lobbying with politicians at 
provincial and national levels. The campaign had a specific focus on appealing to politicians 
to overcome a perceived lack of political commitment to investing in and reforming public 
education. This included attempts to achieve commitments and undertakings from politicians 
and political parties that could be the basis for later accountability claims (DFID 2017b: 5). 
The programme completion review argues that this vertically connected multi-level approach 
was instrumental in the activities achieving greater political prioritisation and resourcing of 
the education system (DFID 2018f: 26). 
 
Unlike Alif Ailaan, the multi-level strategy of the BCSSP did not focus on a single sector, but 
on the ability of civil society organisations in Myanmar to act collectively and form multi-
stakeholder and multi-level coalitions around a number of salient issues. One of the 
strategies employed as part of this broader approach, largely led by the Pyoe Pin project, 
was the instigation, funding, or practical support and brokerage for cross-scale civil society 
networks of various levels of formality. They included networks on legal aid, education, land, 
extractive industries, sex workers, and gender, and 875 CSOs were reported to have been 
part of supported networks over six years (DFID 2016b: 10). The networks connected 
national level organisations more focused on advocacy and policy with more locally focused 
and diverse community-based organisations. Several of the networks established sub-
national level platforms to engage with authorities at those levels, for example on the 
extractives industries. Pyoe Pin deliberately incubated and supported new national networks 
with sub-national links, and provided hands-on support in the practices of network building, 
with one review by the implementing organisation arguing this learning was a significant 
outcome in itself (Ward 2016: 14). Whilst acknowledging the complexity of proving attribution 
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in a complex and fast-changing context, the DFID programme completion review considers 
the ‘reach and clout’ of civil society coalitions developed during the programme a key 
achievement (DFID 2016b: 2).  
 
The formation of vertically linked coalitions was also part of the strategy of several other 
programmes. CEP in Mozambique aimed to develop vertical links between grassroots 
organisations funded to facilitate social accountability processes and two national advocacy 
NGOs. This was anticipated to support the aggregation and presentation of issues raised 
through community monitoring and co-governance mechanisms, but also build and thicken 
vertical relationships between the policy-oriented NGOs and the diversity of smaller 
organisations engaged at district levels (Brook et al. 2017: iii). The Diálogo programme, also 
in Mozambique, undertook activity to gather its municipal level stakeholders together from 
across the country partly in the hope of generating policy action from national level 
authorities and building vertical connections between municipal and national officials, 
including through the national association of municipalities and a ‘national urban forum’ 
(DFID 2018e: 10). The final evaluation found positive contributions to the national 
association, but limited policy traction of these efforts (Shankland et al. 2017: 66). Whilst the 
AAWAZ programme concentrated largely on the surfacing and resolution of issues at more 
local levels, the delivery of the programme through established civil society organisations 
was also reported to support these organisations’ wider advocacy efforts at provincial and 
national levels through providing them greater evidence of ordinary citizens’ needs and 
experiences (DFID 2018c: 23) and through multi-sector state-level provincial forums (DFID 
2018c: 18).  
 
6.3 Developing horizontal linkages and networks 
In addition to these other approaches, most of the programmes clearly set out to build 
horizontal linkages – connecting people, institutions, and actions across different 
geographies or sectors. Documentary evidence suggests this strategy aimed to address 
existing disconnections between isolated sites of action (DFID 2012b: 2), develop social 
capital (DFID 2011b: 12), and develop communities of practice across different sites at the 
same administrative level (DAI 2015: 9; DFID 2018d: 8). The lack of connection is referred to 
in several ways as a result of prior political strategy – with the BCSSP business case 
referring to the need to overcome ‘divisions of survival’ that responded to authoritarian rule 
(DFID 2011b: 4). Horizontal links like this form part of the proposition of Fox (2016), who 
argues that they are likely to strengthen countervailing power and the ability of reformists to 
navigate existing power systems.  
 
Diálogo activities were specifically designed to improve citizen-state relationships and 
interactions in Mozambican municipalities. Working in five major urban centres, the 
programme worked across horizontal scale in a number of ways. One was the linking up of 
government, independent media, and civil society actors across these municipalities, looking 
to spread and create mutual support across geographical areas and develop commonality of 
experience and transfer of skills and experience in participatory governance. Another was a 
significant focus on building networks of civic organisations and groups within these 
municipalities to promote coalitions for action on locally identified priority issues. People 
involved in the programme often described it as having a ‘bridging’ effect, including linking 
civil society actors, officials, elected local politicians, and the media (Lopez Franco 2018). 
The programme also sought to have a ‘spill-over’ effect to other municipalities by engaging 
those trialling participatory governance with other local governments, and through the 
national association of municipal government. Ongoing programme evaluation analysed 
these through exploring coalitions and communities of practices, and their effects, finding 
many positive outcomes of the strategy (IDS 2016; Shankland et al. 2017).  
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The BCSSP explicitly included building horizontal linkages as part of its strategy of 
connecting up civil society organisations and reformers (DFID 2011b: 10). It was particularly 
concerned that fragmentation of civic associations at a local level limited collective voice and 
hoped that developing better links between groups would lead to a more ‘empowered and 
cohesive civil society’ (DFID 2011b: 1). The mid-term review in 2013 found that the 
programme had made ‘truly impressive progress’, including in forging such connections 
(DFID 2013a: 5), although the later Programme Completion Report notes the fast-changing 
context of expanding civic space that the activities operated in at the time (DFID 2016b: 2). 
The Pyoe Pin component of the programme worked at different levels through explicit 
coalition-building around issues that emerged from political economy analysis as salient and 
presenting opportunities for reform. The Paung Ku component worked with small civic 
groups, including farmers’ and neighbourhood associations, to establish connections 
between them in similar geographies and between geographical areas. The programme 
emphasis was on doing this amongst ‘groups that would not normally associate’ (DFID 
2013a: 12). The mid-term review emphasises that the logic of this was developing ‘bridging’ 
social capital within and between civil society groupings7 (DFID 2013a: 15).    
 
Horizontal strategies were also part of other programmes’ approaches. EVA-BHN 
deliberately created horizontal networks of its local level community groups, providing peer 
learning and mutual support between volunteers in different areas (DFID 2018a: 9), and 
supported exchange visits between those involved in district level advocacy forums (Taylor 
and Khan 2017). AAWAZ also connected its local centres and groups in horizontal networks 
across districts (DFID 2017a: 4). The focus on particular sub-national areas meant that these 
networks were fairly dense, and activities such as town hall meetings became commonplace 
in those districts. The CEP business case set out ambitions that CSOs involved in the 
programme would form coalitions together, including across different forms of civil society 
group (DFID 2012a: 8,10). Networks of civic organisations in different geographies were 
intentionally developed as ‘communities of practice’ using face-to-face meetings, email lists 
and social media groups. These were attributed a role in the programme’s deepening and 
broadening of civil society knowledge both of social accountability tools and strategies, and 
of health and education sector policy debates (Brook et al. 2017: 37).  
We can see then that multi-scalar strategies were common across the programmes, with 
most using more than one to some degree. In the next section we move from exploring 
similarities of analysis and strategy to considering how these played out in practice, looking 
at what kinds of effects can be associated with these strategies. 
 
 
7  What were the effects of multi-scalar 
strategies? 
Three distinct multi-scalar strategies could be identified in the programmes we reviewed. 
How did they impact on their outcomes? We propose three types of effects: 
 
• Navigation of the governance landscape – where multi-scalar strategies enabled 
responsiveness at different levels, allowed different layers of accountability to be 
activated, and helped people to focus on accountability ‘targets’. 
• Creating solidarity and legitimacy – where connections between social action both 
vertically and horizontally increased their power to demand accountability either by 
building internal strengths and support, or external legitimacy. 
 
7  Referring to productive connections forged between individuals and groups and others who are different or distant from 
them in some way. 
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• Leveraging evidence and multi-level pressure for policy reform – where networks 
and coalitions between actors at different levels supported advocacy on policy reforms, 
including the institutionalisation of greater citizen engagement in governance. 
 
We discuss each of these in turn in the remainder of this section, with illustrations from within 
the case study programmes. 
 
7.1 Navigation of the governance landscape 
Connecting action and accountability claims across levels, geographies, and sectors were 
reported to have generated important gains in several programmes. Strategies and practices 
that attempted to ‘cover the bases’ of decision-making and use this to find the right 
accountability targets were seen to generate clear successes in some cases. However, 
several reports also highlight the challenges of doing this consistently given the nature of 
power and decision-making in the programme contexts.  
 
7.1.1 Finding and motivating local solutions  
Programmes with a vertical scaling approach, and particularly those with a social 
accountability logic, confirmed the existing evidence from a range of contexts that citizen-
based monitoring and support to formulate demands can generate changes at a ‘point of 
access’ level. Box 7.1 below illustrates this within the case study programmes. Many issues 
were reported to be resolved at the level of the school, health centre, or community where 
they were raised. The evaluation of CEP notes that improvements reported at school and 
health centre level tended to be those that required little new spending and thus could be 
fairly easily resolved (Brook et al. 2017: vi). A similar reflection can be made on the EVA-
BHN programme, in which health centre staff attitude and behaviour were amongst the most 
common concerns raised and the great majority of the thousands of ‘issues’ raised locally 
were not seen as requiring specific higher level discussion or resolution (Taylor and Khan 
2017). In both cases the kinds of issues resolved were often reported to be about holding 
officials accountable for their service delivery responsibilities or improving local facilities and 
infrastructure.  
 
Whilst many of the effects involved changes on the part of service providers or officials, there 
are also clear examples where solutions were brought about through community 
contributions of some kind. An EVA-BHN programme impact case study describes the role of 
local fundraising for ultrasound equipment for the health centre (EVA-BHN n.d.). The CEP 
evaluation notes the importance of community donations of time and materials to improve 
facilities (Brook et al. 2017: 6). This outcome of social accountability programming has been 
noted elsewhere, including in relation to DFID supported activities in Malawi (ICAI 2013b: 
11). Community contributions might represent efficient ways of solving certain problems, and 
embody positive ‘co-production’ (Joshi and Moore 2004) of public services against a 
background of public resource constraints. Youngs (2019: 12) also argues that ‘self-help’ is 
in itself a form of civic activism. However, these co-production or self-help outcomes may 
also function to excuse, rather than exact, accountability from those in higher levels of 
authority. Dias and Tomé (2018) argue that health service community scorecard activity in 
Mozambique ‘inverted’ responsibilities by encouraging community contribution and resolution 
– minimising accountability of those with duties to provide those services. 
 
The key question here is whether the deliberate multi-level design of these sets of activity 
made local resolution and responsiveness more likely or effective. Plausibly, the existence of 
vertical links to higher level bodies that issues could be escalated to, might provide a degree 
of pressure or threat of sanction that motivates lower level solutions. Horizontal links might 
also plausibly build some momentum or generate a shift in norms towards responsiveness. 
The evidence available from the case study programmes isn’t able to confirm either of these 
possibilities, however, partly because of limitations in data available from their outcome 
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measurement schemes. There is some suggestion in the evaluation of CEP that community 
participants felt that without external facilitation from an independent organisation they 
wouldn’t have been listened to (Brook et al. 2017: 14), but it is not clear how far this relates 
to the multi-scalar reach of those organisations. It is also very difficult to judge whether they 
were more or less successful than approaches that didn’t use multi-level design.  
 
Box 7.1 Local demands raised and their resolution 
•  EVA-BHN: By September 2017, three years into the programme, more than 5,000 ‘issues’ had been 
recorded as raised at a facility or community level, of which more than 2,000 had been resolved (Taylor 
and Khan 2017: 19). By the end of that year, 1,770 of the issues were reported to have been raised for 
discussion at the district level (DFID 2018b: 2), which reviews take to suggest a high rate of local 
resolution.  
•  CEP: More than 10,000 people were reported to have participated in community monitoring and 
prioritisation processes within CEP. At the end of the programme, 56 per cent of schools and 65 per 
cent of health facilities engaged were judged to have ‘introduced changes as a result of citizen 
monitoring’ (DFID 2018e: 7). 
•  AAWAZ: By the end of the AAWAZ programme nearly 30,000 ‘demands’ were reported by the project 
as being raised with public officials or political representatives individually, in town hall meetings, or 
other coordination mechanisms (DFID 2018d). The DFID programme completion report claims that 
more than 27,000 improvements in services were made in response (DFID 2018d: 17). 
 
 
7.1.2 Escalation to activate accountability at higher levels 
Several of the case study programmes provide evidence of vertical integration allowing for 
issues that can’t be resolved at a local level to be escalated to those with greater authority. 
Within the social accountability oriented programmes, the first level of aggregation in their 
vertical systems seem to have offered the most space for activating higher level responses, 
allowing them in some cases to overcome local resistance to change or reach officials with 
the power or resource to support solutions. Independent assessments of both EVA-BHN and 
CEP give particular examples in relation to service staffing. In these cases appeals 
channelled through district-level forums gained responses of allocating new staff to under-
resourced services (Brook et al. 2017: 42; Taylor and Khan 2017: 9). In both programmes 
there are also reports of sanctioning or removal of poorly performing staff (Brook et al. 2017: 
15; EVA-BHN n.d.). The independent assessment of EVA-BHN notes that relationships built 
between citizen representatives and health service officials at the district level developed 
acceptance of citizen monitoring data and feedback processes, and supported prioritisation 
of service improvements (Taylor and Khan 2017: 14). The Myanmar Alliance for 
Transparency and Accountability (MATA), supported by the BCSSP, has used its national 
presence to draw attention to specific local issues that otherwise, they argue, would have 
gone under the radar (MATA, interview, Yangon, June, 2018). A separate study claims that 
jade mining conditions and impacts in one particular area in the north of Myanmar were 
taken up nationally as a result of this multi-scalar approach (Christian Aid 2017: 23). 
 
Two observations seem interesting from these experiences in terms of understanding what 
might determine how effective multi-level approaches are for escalation. First, there are 
questions of what kinds of spaces or structures to use. The macro-evaluation based on DFID 
programmes found that using existing state structures and ‘invited spaces’ was a necessary 
condition for sustained change to emerge from donor-led social accountability activities (e-
Pact 2016). The CEP approach to escalation fits this model. Existing multi-sectoral forums 
were used by the implementing CSOs to present advocacy stories from local scorecard and 
co-governance processes. Additionally, local health and education staff communicated 
requests drawn from these processes upward through their management hierarchy. However 
EVA-BHN’s reported success was achieved through new, externally convened groups, which 
Esser (2018) characterises as ‘additive’ to existing management nature structures. The EVA-
BHN District and Provincial Advocacy Forums brought health officials, politicians, journalists, 
 34 
and local influencers together with locally nominated representatives of community-based 
monitoring groups. Programme documentation argues that these new groups were 
necessary as suitable existing structures for citizen interface were unavailable – where 
suitability also included a view of how far they were effected by elite capture and represented 
genuine opportunities for engagement, including by women (Palladium 2016b: 1). Evidence 
suggests that the construction of these spaces enabled the programme to set the agenda 
based on citizen issues, bring in the weight of relatively powerful actors (such as journalists) 
to support citizens’ demands, and build trust with officials outside of formal decision-making 
spaces (Taylor and Khan 2017: 14). The approach of BCSSP, through the Pyoe Pin project, 
was to establish new ‘issue coalitions’ with carefully selected members who often had 
existing influence (British Council 2016a). It may be that where spaces for citizen 
participation are particularly rare or closed, and informal power is important, ‘additive’ spaces 
are necessary. 
 
Second, the programme experiences confirm what might seem a fairly obvious point; the 
success of escalating to the ‘supervisory’ level of authority is dependent on that level in the 
vertical hierarchy having the ability or resources (as well as the willingness) to respond. The 
evaluation of CEP notes that the lack of vertical responsiveness to issues raised in the 
education system was connected to the limited discretion of district-level officials and 
extreme resource pressures (Brook et al. 2017). Examples are given of officials making 
requests of their superiors to fix issues prioritised by communities, but these not being 
prioritised, with the evaluation suggesting that this kind of procedural aggregation of priorities 
to district level is insufficient, and needs the active advocacy of those involved to get redress 
or reform (Brook et al. 2017: 43). The independent assessment of the EVA-BHN programme 
noted that responsiveness to community-generated demands increased once the Punjab 
level government delegated more resources to the district level (Taylor and Khan 2017: v), 
suggesting that this meant that prioritised issues could actually be addressed. Esser (2018) 
recommends to the programmes in Pakistan that the district level should be the focus of any 
future similar programmes, given the concentration of resources and decision-making power 
at this level. Such patterns of delegation are liable to change, however, perhaps more so in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings, and subsequent changes in local governance in 
Pakistan may well have changed the grounds on which this recommendation was made. At a 
broader level, these experiences suggest that analysis of what levels need to be included in 
a multi-level approach might be key to success; with a focus on where decisions might 
actually be taken. 
 
7.1.3 Locating alternative ‘accountability targets’ 
Working across scales might also present more options where bottlenecks and resistance to 
change present a problem. A fundamental question behind the vertical integration of 
accountability mechanisms is whether such integration and externally induced strategies can 
get to where the relevant decision-making power lies for different issues. Given that it might 
be located in various parts of the system in different moments and specific local contexts, 
and that we might expect this to be less legible and static with background conditions of 
conflict and fragility, a truly vertically integrated system to channel citizen demand needs to 
run effectively across this system. This includes outside of the immediate sector or service 
delivery hierarchy, as well as outside of formal sources of authority and decision-making. 
Evidence from the programmes gives instances where this kind of navigation of the 
accountability landscape has been possible, but also where the nature of these systems of 
authority have limited success.  
 
There are several examples where the programme activities ‘skipped’ levels or went to 
alternative authorities to circumvent blockages and address more systemic issues. A case 
study of impact written by the EVA-BHN programme illustrates one way to do this by making 
claims of different authorities. In this example, the poor condition of health centres was 
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addressed not by activating health service decision-making, but by including a number of 
renovations and improvements in the separate local government budget (EVA-BHN n.d.). 
The external mid-term evaluation of the Diálogo programme highlighted that the focus of 
activities were on services or decisions that lay solely with the municipal authorities, despite 
a number of important services being delivered in cities by national government departments 
and state-owned companies, or there being mixed accountabilities for these (IDS 2016). The 
programme subsequently introduced activities to address this through upward advocacy to 
national levels on decentralisation policy and the specific issues affecting municipalities 
(Shankland et al. 2017: 11). This included working through the national association of 
municipalities, ANAMM, in order to find allies from other municipalities. However one 
respondent central to the programme management emphasised the difficulty of this given a 
‘huge gap’ between the municipal and national level and the lack of a driving central issue to 
campaign on (Lopez Franco 2018). Another described this national advocacy as a significant 
‘leap’ from the original programme design (Lopez Franco 2018). CEP also placed a focus on 
linking facility and community level advocacy and civic engagement with national policy given 
a lack of discretion and response at the district and provincial levels, with the evaluation 
suggesting that the programme had surfaced a ‘missing middle between local accountability 
and national policy’ in Mozambique (Brook et al. 2017: iii). The BCSSP activities went 
beyond the national level in several cases and worked with international actors and 
partnerships as part of their influencing strategies. Examples include developing a regional 
South East Asia Legal Aid Network to provide wider support for the Myanmar Legal Aid 
Network (British Council 2016b: 33), and reporting issues directly to the international 
secretariat of the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative when the national government 
was unresponsive (MATA, interview, Yangon, June, 2018; Vijge 2018). These illustrate what 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) have called the ‘boomerang strategy’ to circumventing obstructions 
at the national level.  
 
The programmes also give us some illustration and understanding of why these navigations 
are necessary in these contexts. First, the formal decision-making systems tackled by the 
programmes were, on the whole, relatively centralised with limited discretion at lower levels, 
as identified in programme contextual analyses. In Mozambique political dynamics meant 
that national level resistance was reportedly linked to the fact that some municipal areas 
involved in the Diálogo programme were run by the opposition party. Second, decision-
making is not only formal, but informed by personal and political relationships and informal 
powerholders. EVA-BHN tried to address informal power structures by tactically choosing to 
engage influential people in key roles in the programme and its fora, alongside more 
marginalised people, ‘protecting and amplifying voices’ (Palladium 2016b: 11). However 
according to practitioners, it also experienced cases where decisions made in those fora, 
even by those with designated formal power, were later overturned as a result of informal 
power structures. In one example, a member of staff was assigned for transfer after repeated 
complaints from the community-based monitoring group, but managed to use political 
contacts to have three separate transfer orders overturned (Taylor and Khan 2017: 12). CEP 
was able to leverage the personal networks and credibility of the directors of its sector lead 
CSOs (N’weti and CESC) as well as the programme director herself (as a former Ministry of 
Health official). However according to some interviewees tensions between the central 
management team and the sector lead NGOs limited the overall effectiveness of this 
leveraging strategy. The CEP programme completion review notes that despite successes 
the programme made clear the extent to which ‘national policy frameworks are implemented 
according to local politics’ (DFID 2018d: 8), alluding to similar informal dynamics. 
 
7.2 Creating solidarity and legitimacy  
The second set of effects of multi-scalar strategies we found in reviewing DFID programmes 
were in building solidarity between social actors seeking changes to services, policy reforms, 
and greater civic engagement in governance, and the perceived legitimacy of their claims 
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and efforts. Both of these are related to coherence and strength of countervailing forces, but 
they come from different directions. Solidarity, as a form of ‘power with’ (VeneKlasen et al. 
2002: 55) might result in greater collectivity in action, and confidence to take action. 
Legitimacy is more outward facing and a factor in how action is perceived by others – in 
particular formal authorities but also international actors. The two factors are connected in 
the extent to which increased collective power also drives a sense of legitimacy amongst 
actors. They are also connected in that they are both functions or creations of particular 
kinds of coalition-building, understood as a process that goes beyond less densely formed 
networks or alliances of interests to bring together differently positioned actors in common 
cause (Fox 2010). 
 
Both of these support a common logic in programme design that tries to establish ‘strength in 
numbers’ through multi-scalar activity, and to develop the ‘critical mass’ required for reform 
that is discussed in several programme design statements (Brook et al. 2017: 65; DAI 2015: 
15; Shankland et al. 2017: 11). Review of other DFID empowerment and accountability 
programmes notes that building this critical mass was also a common rationale for activities 
funded in other contexts (ICAI 2013b: 10, 2018: 26). Similar effects have been highlighted as 
important in international NGO-led accountability programmes (Amakom et al. 2018: 19; 
Fooks 2013: 6). As well as potentially having direct empowerment outcomes for those that 
benefit, these effects might also do some groundwork for future accountability claims and 
increase the chances that these claims have sufficient ‘clout’, the term used to note the 
effects of civil society coalition building in the final report on the BCSSP (DFID 2016b: 2). 
 
7.2.1 Solidarity  
Effects that we describe as increasing solidarity are about building the internal strength of 
reformist coalitions, campaigns and civic action. Programmes variously reported building 
collective identity amongst previously dispersed groups and sets of activity, giving them 
greater shared purpose, leveraging cross group support, and allowing them to explore the 
common causes of their relative weakness in relation to more powerful actors. Programmes 
adopted this language to greater and lesser degrees. Alif Ailaan, for example, was explicitly 
presented as building a ‘social movement’ around education reform (DFID 2018f: 1) that 
recruited ‘mobilisers’ at community level. Several programmes explicitly use language of 
coalition-building.  
 
Interviews with key actors in the Diálogo and CEP programmes in Mozambique identified 
that structured exchange of experiences, and the opportunity to generate informal networks 
of reformists were key in the programmes’ successes. The Diálogo programme’s strategy 
emphasised horizontal coalition-building which was based on ‘connecting and promoting 
synergies between actors’ within and across municipalities and purposefully ‘amplifying the 
networks’ (Lopez Franco 2018). However a number of interviewees on the programme noted 
challenges in building these coalitions, particularly as NGOs and CSOs were reluctant to 
engage openly with one another in a broader environment of competition for donor funding, 
and other donors such as USAID encouraging the same organisations to focus on service 
delivery rather than advocacy (Lopez Franco 2018). The independent assessment of the 
EVA-BHN programme found efforts to link up community group coordinators horizontally to 
build ‘a sense of collective identity’ between these volunteers which included ‘an 
understanding of their common problems’ (Taylor and Khan 2017: 13). It also highlighted the 
role of women-only community groups established under the programme, noting ‘a strong 
sense of solidarity’ emerging from these spaces (Taylor and Khan 2017: 30). 
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Box 7.2 Solidarity through multi-scalar networks in Myanmar 
Amongst several multi-level civil society networks supported by the BCSSP programme in Myanmar was the 
Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability (MATA). MATA was initially formed to drive civil society 
voice when the Government of Myanmar announced an intention to join the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in 2011. Whilst the government initially wanted to choose ‘friendly’ NGOs to join the steering 
group, donors supported local activists to create a viable alternative in MATA (Christian Aid 2017:19). 
MATA members and staff gave several examples in interviews where internal connections within the alliance 
gave rise to solidarity actions. They reported how members across the country ‘mobilised’ when one sub-
national area pursued what they called a ‘clamp-down on CSOs’ through new regulations – threatening 
national protests that saw the regulations cancelled (MATA, Interview, Yangon, June 2018). In another 
example they claimed that the announcement that they planned a national protest march drove the release 
from prison of member local activists who had been part of demonstrations aimed at the Kayah State 
(provincial) government (MATA, Interview, Yangon, June 2018). In 2014 MATA threatened to boycott the EITI 
process in response to the police shooting of an activist protesting the environmental impact of the Letpadaung 
copper mine, drawing international attention to both the impact of the extractive industries in Myanmar but also 
the state response to challenge (Vijge 2018). 
  
One of the effects of increased solidarity that relates specifically to multi-scalar strategies is 
the ability of connected actors and groups to act in protection or support of others. This was 
evident particularly in the work of the BCSSP in Myanmar. Examples from the work of a 
programme-supported national civil society alliance are given in Box 7.2. These effects are 
also reported by external reviews of MATA’s work. Vijge (2018) suggests that the alliance 
formed gave individual organisations ‘a sense of security... against the Myanmar government 
and army’ (Vijge 2018: 23). A separate study of the nature of CSO networks in Myanmar that 
covered many of those supported by BCSSP reported that network participation was spoken 
of by members as a way to sustain their motivations, arguing that these networks make 
solidarity ‘visible’ (Christian Aid 2017: 18, 39). 
 
7.2.2 Legitimacy 
In several programmes multi-scalar links also seem connected with the sense of external 
legitimacy of those taking action (whether citizen-based monitoring groups, or CSOs making 
representative claims), the nature of the social action, and the accountability claims 
stimulated and supported. The focus appears to have been on the perceived legitimacy in 
the eyes of decision makers or power-holders – most notably governments and officials – but 
this also connects with the work of several programmes to promote the role of new social 
actors and mobilised citizens in independent media coverage. 
 
The Alif Ailaan campaign seemingly derived legitimacy from its attempts to stimulate a broad-
based and country-wide coalition for education service reform and prioritisation, validating 
local action under the umbrella of a larger campaign. Esser (2018: 17) notes this reach as 
particularly valuable in the Alif Ailaan programme in contrast to the two other programmes he 
explored in Pakistan. Programme documentation refers to the importance of building 
‘demand at the constituency level’ for reform (DFID 2017b: 15) and this work entailed 
localisation of the campaign in 50 districts involving more than 7,000 volunteers (DFID 2018f: 
14).  
 
According to our interviewees, Dialogo’s local legitimacy came from brokering links between 
CSOs, media and local government, and also between municipalities run by the opposition 
and by the national ruling party – exercising convening power across scales. CEP used 
national networks to enhance the legitimacy of service monitoring, aligning this with national 
policies on strengthening local co-management initiatives and conveying these to local 
facilitators. In interviews for the evaluation, several facilitators or community members noted 
that they did not feel they would have been taken seriously by teachers or health 
professionals without external support, with the evaluation concluding that the programme 
‘lent weight and authority’ to the community engagement processes (Brook et al. 2017: 14). 
In a case identified in an impact tracing study by the EVA-BHN programme, the denial of a 
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vaccination for a child by a local health worker was successfully challenged when activists 
within the programme used this kind of external legitimacy to stage a campaign, including a 
protest outside the district health office (EVA-BHN n.d.).  
 
Within BCSSP the coverage and depth of networks with national representation was given as 
a significant source of legitimacy by interviewees. The Land Core Group (LCG) is a research 
and advocacy network of land activists and CSOs in different areas across Myanmar. 
Representatives from LCG suggested that the recognised strength of their network was 
behind their ability to call a significant public consultation on new land laws announced by the 
government, which meant that the laws were subsequently amended (Land Core Group, 
interview, Yangon, 2018). A leader of MATA spoke of the vertical and horizontal connections 
within the alliance as a source of ‘legitimate power’ in relation to authorities (MATA, 
interview, Yangon, June, 2018). Others involved in the coalition noted how this collective 
power meant that whilst individual members often failed to get information from government, 
requests through MATA were more successful as the coalition was seen as more able to 
‘make a problem’ if they didn’t get the information (MATA, interview, Yangon, June, 2018). 
This effect was not only seen when requests were escalated up to the national level, but also 
for those flowed downward to support local level action. Members of MATA reported various 
examples where their actions to monitor extractive industries were validated or permitted 
through their connection to the national network, including a case where citizen monitoring 
had led to badly managed mines being closed (MATA, interview, Yangon, June 2018). 
During our stakeholder workshop with programme practitioners from different contexts this 
was referred to in terms of donor programmes providing a ‘protective umbrella’; using the 
relative political strength of donors and some national NGOs to decrease the risks to local 
challenges of power structures and decision makers. 
 
There were however challenges to the perceived legitimacy of some of the programmes and 
the activities they support, connected to issues of scale. In EVA-BHN and CEP the evidence 
generated by citizen monitoring was not seen by some as sufficiently weighty to drive 
reforms. The independent assessment of EVA-BHN found that responsiveness from 
provincial level authorities was affected by the relatively small geographical scope of the 
programme and thus a view of the evidence generated as of ‘limited scale’ (Taylor and Khan 
2017: v). Esser reports a view from one development sector stakeholder that a focus on a 
small number of areas made it ‘more of an irritant than a game changer’ (2018: 22). In CEP, 
national advocacy organisations could use grassroots data in combination with other 
evidence from the provinces and districts covered, but one member of staff told us ‘having a 
weight of argument based on these small samples was unrealistic’ (Lopez Franco 2018). It is 
notable that other case evidence on vertically integrated citizen monitoring and advocacy 
involves much more significant geographical coverage (Aceron 2018; Aceron and Isaac 
2016; Fox 2016).  
 
7.3 Leveraging evidence and multi-level pressure for policy reform 
All of the programmes we explored aimed to have wider levels of impact on service delivery 
and citizen-state relations through stimulating high-level policy change, using their multi-level 
approaches as part of this. Two kinds of impacts were hoped for. One was that evidence 
conveying the realities of citizen experiences and preferences informed new policy or 
practice. The other was that citizen engagement in service monitoring, co-governance, or 
policy processes became more widely recognised and institutionalised. Both were envisaged 
to have impacts wider than the specific geographies or sectors the programmes worked in 
and longer-run dividends in terms of state-society relations. The programmes were in various 
ways trying to connect the different ‘institutional geographies’ (Fox 2016: 19) of service 
delivery, policies, and governing frameworks, whereby those closest to the problem become 
the ‘eyes and ears’ of national advocates (Fox 2016: 18). The ability to attribute policy 
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impacts of donor-led interventions like the ones we’ve looked at is limited even in the detailed 
evaluations available, but a number of examples are given by the programmes. 
 
7.3.1 Reforms to the content of public policy 
All programmes we looked at targeted and reported impacts on specific public policies at the 
national or sub-national level. These were linked to multi-scalar activities either by drawing 
up evidence to higher levels of decision-making or establishing pressures at multiple points 
in the system. As discussed in the next section, achieving policy impacts like these was 
commonly part of official programme measurement frameworks.  
 
The two programmes with the strongest social accountability logic, CEP and EVA-BHN, both 
give illustrations of taking experiences from geographically-targeted citizen-based monitoring 
and prioritisation, and engaging in policy that affects a wider population. The CEP evaluation 
gives examples of how the national level CSOs involved in the programme used the 
grassroots experience data generated by the programme as part of their national 
campaigning. It notes that citizen-monitoring data was used as supportive evidence in 
national level reports by the education advocacy organisation (CESC) and informed their 
campaigning on teacher and student absenteeism (Brook et al. 2017: 29). The cross-scalar 
links gave what a CESC member of staff called a ‘clear uniting goal’ (Lopez Franco 2018). In 
the health sector the evaluation reports that the national advocacy partner organisation, 
N’weti, ‘was able to play a strategic role linking local realities with national policy’ using CEP 
generated data – for example emphasising that national level indicators on medicine 
availability were incongruent with ‘demand-side’ evidence from citizens that medicines were 
still in short supply (Brook et al. 2017: 50). Within the timeframe of the project, however, 
neither the evaluation nor the programme completion review were able to point to specific 
policy wins based on or responding to the aggregation of citizen voice through the 
programme. In addition to its reportedly greater success at activating reform and re-
prioritisation at the district level, EVA-BHN claims some more systemic success at the 
provincial level in Pakistan, where the majority of responsibility for health service financing 
and delivery rests. One example was the establishment of a Patient’s Rights Charter in one 
of the provinces the programme worked in, which its reports argue reflected the kinds of 
service provision issues that emerged as particularly important from aggregated citizen 
experiences and demands (EVA-BHN n.d.). Produced in partnership with the Provincial 
Health Care Commission, a formal oversight body, this may lay the ground for future 
accountability claims, with standards of fair treatment and access to services now formally 
recognised by authorities. The independent assessment of EVA-BHN also suggests that the 
programme played a role in making the case for delegation of budgets to lower levels in 
order to resolve issues more effectively, using evidence from the programme to illustrate how 
greater local discretion could improve services and experiences (Taylor and Khan 2017: 24). 
 
Other programmes used connections across scales in ways that might be seen to pressure 
different parts of the system to prioritise reform. Alif Ailaan sought to mobilise local 
campaigners behind a set of core asks and advocacy priorities at a national level, which they 
were tasked with localising at district and provincial levels within the overall umbrella of the 
campaign (DFID 2018f: 14). The programme created new presentations of data and 
conducted multi-level research to support these local asks (DFID 2018f: 8). It also used 
these connections and advocacy at different levels to reinforce a sense of widespread 
prioritisation. The Programme Completion Report for the programme argues that this multi-
level strategy was a key factor in what it sees as the success of the campaign – pressuring 
politicians by creating a ‘constant buzz around them at all levels’ (DFID 2018f: 15). The 
Programme Completion Report also considers the Alif Ailaan campaign to have made a 
‘significantly positive contribution’ to education sector reforms at different levels, including a 
reduction in the number of children out of school, increased provincial budgets for maths and 
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science education, and infrastructure improvements in more than 800 schools (DFID 2018f: 
16). 
 
The AAWAZ programme reported successes in influencing six specific pieces of provincial 
and national level legislation on gender equality based in part on the credibility of expertise 
developed from local women’s groups, which included contributions to drafting as well as 
lobbying and advocacy on issues like violence against women, although little detail on these 
processes is given (DFID 2018c: 21). Amongst the policy influencing reported by activities in 
the BCSSP there are also examples of the programme enabling localised concerns and 
struggles to be represented in national advocacy and in the policy frameworks. For example, 
MATA representatives reported that grassroots evidence on State Owned Enterprises’ 
involvement in local disputes about mining was used to pressure government to include 
these organisations in the scope of the next EITI report (MATA, interview, Yangon, June, 
2018). Whilst warning about the difficulty of attributing policy changes to a single programme 
in this context, the final assessment of the BCSSP reports ‘compelling narratives’ on how 
multi-level coalitions supported more inclusive and pro-poor policy (DFID 2016b: 4). 
 
7.3.2 Reforms to institutionalise citizen participation 
There are also ways in which the programmes tried to use their multi-scalar strategies to 
create greater commitment for citizen engagement in governance issues generally and open 
up the policy-making process.   
 
In CEP these kinds of outcomes were prioritised through the national advocacy partners. It 
worked in particular to strengthen commitment to the policy regarding ‘co-governance’ 
mechanisms of joint management committees of citizens and providers at the service level. 
However the programme also undertook advocacy, pushing national ministries to include 
more performance indicators that reflect citizen experiences on areas such as medicine 
availability (Brook et al. 2017: 50). In education, the national partner CESC reported that 
CEP experiences of co-governance allowed them to galvanise national support for regional 
and national fora of school management committees, as well as share positive examples of 
local problem resolution through these mechanisms to counter perceptions that CSOs were 
only presenting problems rather than solutions (Brook et al. 2017: 31). Whilst the 
Government of Mozambique didn’t subsequently adopt new citizen engagement policies, our 
discussions with local stakeholders revealed some felt that the programme’s successes had 
opened the eyes of some officials, and especially donors, to the potential for citizen-based 
monitoring in the country, and led to discussions about using external influence to 
institutionalise these approaches (Lopez Franco 2018). Subsequently CEP-inspired citizen 
participation and monitoring mechanisms were built into a new World Bank health sector 
programme through the advocacy of CEP’s national health partner, N’weti. Another impact in 
terms of national advocacy and programme learning was the recognition of the need to 
aggregate and analyse facility-level evidence more effectively. This informed the 
development of a database to capture citizen experiences and demands that included social 
accountability initiatives funded by several other donors and run by a range of NGOs, 
potentially creating a longer-term link between national advocacy and grounded evidence. 
Similarly, the end evaluation of the Diálogo programme noted increased openness to 
participatory governance approaches in the target municipalities, as well as substantial 
interest in other urban areas in the participatory budgeting approach in particular, which was 
actively promoted in ‘lesson learning’ sessions for other areas (Shankland et al. 2017: 8).   
 
In Pakistan, EVA-BHN worked to build citizen monitoring and ongoing spaces for dialogue 
into the district and provincial levels, seeing the work as establishing ‘proof of concept’ for the 
benefits of citizen engagement. Towards the end of the programme both provincial 
governments issued instructions for officials to establish or reinvigorate district-level dialogue 
platforms with citizens’ representatives. The independent assessment found that it was likely 
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that this was driven by the ‘pressure’ created by EVA-BHN’s demonstration of how these 
could work, and the expectations raised amongst communities of ongoing involvement in 
decisions (Taylor and Khan 2017: 24). EVA-BHN was also regarded as having been 
instrumental in the incorporation of ‘demand-side’ indicators on citizen experiences and 
‘client satisfaction’ into the measures used by the independent oversight commission on the 
health sector in KP province (Taylor and Khan 2017: 24). The AAWAZ programme 
completion review argues that the programme ‘broke the monopoly of executive oversight’ 
(DFID 2018c: 21) and had an important and likely lasting impact on social norms of women 
and young people’s participation. However there is little detail on any institutionalisation of 
these effects, although evidence is presented that suggests that attitudes to women’s 
political and civic participation had become more positive during the programme (DFID 
2018c: 22). Towards the end of the Alif Ailaan programme new outcome measures were 
added to identify how far it was bringing about changes that might outlast the campaign, for 
example how far ‘popular demand’ for education sector reform was mobilised (DFID 2017b: 
15). The programme also formed issue and geographical alliances of CSOs to adopt and 
take forward the campaign messages after its end (DFID 2018f: 14).  
 
An interesting reflection to emerge from our engagement with practitioners in these 
programmes was how these longer-run outcomes of institutionalising citizen engagement in 
governance practices, and changing ‘the rules of the game’ were prioritised over the more 
immediate policy changes emphasised in the expected programme results. In the next 
section we explore this and other tensions and issues that emerge from the ways that 
programmes officially measured their impact. 
 
 
8  How did the programmes measure their 
multi-scalar activity? 
The previous sections have explored how multi-scalar accountability strategies have been 
used in DFID-funded programmes, and what kinds of effects we can see associated with 
these. In our study we also set out to understand how far DFID-funded programmes 
contribute to the evidence base for adopting strategies of this kind. We explored the ways in 
which programme activity was monitored and evaluated and evidence and learning on 
changes gathered, analysed, and shared. This included detailed review of official 
measurement frameworks as well as internal and external evaluations as far as they were 
available, and discussions with programme stakeholders both during fieldwork and in a wider 
practitioner workshop in the UK about these issues.  
 
In this section we first summarise the kinds of monitoring and outcome measurement 
approaches taken in our sample of programmes and discuss the choices made. We note 
differences in conceptualising measures of empowerment and accountability, a focus on 
quantitative measures, and a lack of measurement specifically on multi-scalar effects. We 
then look at the broader evidence available outside of these frameworks, including provider-
produced evidence, independent evaluations, and evaluative content and reflections in other 
documentation. Finally, we draw out some implications of the limitations of the evidence in 
terms of a wider ambition to learn from these programmes and what our study suggests 
drives these limitations. We explore differences in the quality and robustness, and indications 
of a potentially rich but inaccessible set of relevant data held by programme implementers. 
 
8.1 Programme monitoring regimes  
The programmes we looked at all used a ‘logical framework’ as a way to record the extent 
and results of activities. Current DFID guidance does not require programmes to use a 
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logical framework approach but notes that this is commonly how programmes meet the 
requirement to record expected and actual results (DFID 2019c: 69). The logical framework 
monitoring tools we saw followed the standard structure used within DFID where statements 
of impact, outcome, and outputs are linked hierarchically along with indicators or measures 
for each. The ‘logical’ element of this approach is an assumption that these are causally 
linked; that lower level activities measured contribute to higher level and more significant 
overall changes. All programmes had far more extensive monitoring regimes and evidence 
collation practices than were expressed in these logical frameworks. However, the logical 
frameworks are important because the standard structure of annual and completion reviews 
of programmes tends to tightly follow indicators and targets from these. The success or 
failure of a programme is largely judged in relation to the chosen indicators. This produces 
incentives in terms of where programmes concentrate their resources both in implementation 
and in generating evidence and analysis. These incentives and effects are widely discussed 
in the literature on measuring change in donor programmes (Eyben et al. 2015; Holland et al. 
2009; Shutt 2016) and in terms of DFID management practice specifically (Valters and Whitty 
2017). Their implications for programme learning have also been explored by the UK 
Independent Commission on Aid Impact8 (ICAI 2014, 2019).  
 
Each programme set out some initial expectations of results and measurement in their 
business cases, which were then developed further as programmes progressed. We found 
evidence of regular changes to logical frameworks, expected results, and measurement 
approaches both in iterations of the logical frameworks through different versions we saw, 
and in the reports of programme implementers. In some cases these changes were 
explained in annual review documentation. Where logical frameworks were publicly available 
on the Development Tracker website these typically reported results against the included 
measures for the previous years, although it was often difficult to find out how measures 
were defined and measurement undertaken.  
 
Table 8.1 below summarises the kinds of measurement used in these logical frameworks at 
output and outcome level. We then explore the frameworks in relation to their choices in 
three areas – indicators of empowerment and accountability, the use of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, and explicit measurement of multi-level and multi-scalar 
interactions.    
 
Table 8.1 Summary of output and outcome monitoring measures of studied 
programmes 
Programme Outputs Outcomes 
AAWAZ 
 
PCR 
• Numbers of participants in training, activities, 
forums, and action at several levels and by sub-
national location. 
• Changes in knowledge, behaviour and attitudes 
amongst participants 
• Volume of citizen ‘demands’ raised in different 
fora  
• Number of policy and implementation changes 
made with some attribution to programme 
activities 
• Number of research and evidencing projects 
and associated advocacy campaigns completed 
• Impacts on legislation supporting 
rights of women and excluded 
groups 
• Knowledge, behaviour and attitudes 
survey on women’s political 
participation and violence against 
women 
• Reported use and satisfaction of 
excluded groups with public services 
• Direct and indirect beneficiaries of 
AAWAZ forums and centres  
(Cont’d.)  
 
8  ICAI was established in 2011 to provide independent scrutiny of UK Overseas Development Assistance, reporting to 
parliament through the International Development Select Committee. As part of its mandate to explore the effectiveness 
of UK development programming it conducts learning reviews on particular areas of practice. 
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Table 8.1 (cont’d.) 
Programme Outputs Outcomes 
Alif Ailaan 
 
PCR 
• Reflection of programme advocacy goals in 
political party, politician, and opinion leader 
knowledge and actions 
• Policy influencing activities; research, individual 
briefings,  
• Number of government policy actions in line with 
campaign priorities 
• Increases in quantity and quality of media 
coverage of education issues 
• Extent of campaign membership from CSOs 
and activists and alliance-building 
• Volume of localised campaigning by activists 
• Budget allocations to education 
• Improved learning outcomes 
• Decreases in out-of-school children 
• Adoption of campaign goals by 
CSOs and campaigners 
• Increased demand for and 
understanding of quality education 
amongst parents and politicians 
• Increased political will to prioritise 
education reform 
BCSSP 
 
PCR, MTR 
• Qualitative scoring of increases in collaboration, 
shared analysis, and policy influencing skills 
amongst CSOs* 
• Issues identified for advocacy, and reform 
coalitions built around them. 
• Reach and inclusivity of coalitions and advocacy 
campaigns 
• Qualitative scoring of increases in horizontal 
and vertical linkages between groups* 
• Qualitative scoring of CSO organisational 
capacities 
• Media initiatives and reporting of issues relevant 
to reform coalitions 
• Quality of civil society advocacy 
cooperation, communication, and 
inclusiveness* 
• Number of coalitions using evidence-
based advocacy strategies 
• Evidence of increased social capital 
CEP 
 
PCR 
• Reach and understanding of citizen awareness 
activities on rights and entitlements 
• Reach and volume of citizen-based monitoring/ 
community scorecard activities 
• Development of action plans by facilities/ 
services to address priorities 
• Volume of operating co-governance 
mechanisms (school/health centre committees) 
• Volume of advocacy activity to higher term 
authorities using programme evidence and on 
specific issues that need higher level resolution  
• Dissemination of learning and tools developed 
• Number of public service facilities 
introducing changes as a result of 
citizen monitoring 
• Service users’ perceptions of 
influence over service provision 
Diálogo 
 
PCR 
• Civic groups and community leaders supported 
and subsequently engaging with municipal 
institutions 
• Number of coalitions developed 
• Volume of media coverage of municipal 
governance issues and marginalised 
populations 
• Number of journalists trained 
• Provision of technical support to Municipal 
Institutions 
• Behaviour change of Municipal Institutions 
• Dissemination/advocacy based on lessons 
learnt 
• Citizen perceptions of their inclusion 
in municipal governance* 
• CSO capacity to engage in municipal 
governance (qualitative score) 
• Increased quantity and quality of 
media coverage of municipal 
governance issues 
• Municipal Institutions capacity to 
engage other social actors 
• Volume of participatory events run 
by Municipal Institutions 
• Advocacy to influence national policy 
and influence other municipalities 
EVA-BHN9 
 
Logframe 
• Number of citizens reached through public 
health/rights and entitlement communications 
• Number of demands raised from local groups to 
district level, and their outcome 
• Level of relevant coverage of health and 
nutrition issues in print and television media 
• Number of changes in government 
policies and/or practices where EVA-
BHN contributed 
Source: Authors’ summarisation from programme completion reviews and logical frameworks. Asterisks mark measures 
included in final frameworks but ultimately not measured over the course of the programme.  
 
9  The comparatively lower number of measures and indicators for EVA-BHN in the formal logical framework is explained 
by its place as a sub-component of a much larger programme of investment.  
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8.1.1 Measures of empowerment and accountability outcomes 
We looked at how empowerment and accountability outcomes were measured in programme 
logical frameworks. The growth of development programmes seeking these kinds of 
outcomes took place in parallel with the shift in programme measurement and evaluation 
towards more ‘results-based’ models (Valters and Whitty 2017), and the consequence of this 
has been a period of trialling and testing ways in which these outcomes can be identified and 
counted. There have also been a number of contributions exploring how impact of 
empowerment and accountability programmes can be evaluated, and providing advice on 
measuring change (Eyben et al. 2015; Holland et al. 2009; Rocha Menocal and Sharma 
2009). Practitioners made it clear during our discussions that they don’t yet feel they have 
sufficient solutions to these measurement challenges.  
 
Within our focus programme logical frameworks, accountability outcomes were largely 
framed in terms of national policy changes or changes in practices in particular service 
sectors, or as the voicing of and response to demands from mobilised citizens. Programmes 
commonly looked to count the number of instances or examples where policy or practice 
change resulted from the expression of citizen voice or civic engagement activities, whether 
through individual demands or the aggregation or representation of these in advocacy 
processes. This policy level impact was looked for at different levels of authority and with 
different sectoral policy targets. Three programmes specifically counted the volume of citizen 
‘demands’ raised on public authorities (AAWAZ, CEP, EVA-BHN). The EVA-BHN monitoring 
framework was unusual amongst these in disaggregating how many of these demands were 
considered to be met (or ‘issues resolved’), although the CEP counted how many schools 
and health centres had responded to community scorecard prioritisation.  
 
Empowerment outcomes were rarely monitored in logical frameworks. Despite many of the 
programmes involving citizen education and rights awareness initiatives, often reaching high 
numbers of people, their monitoring frameworks tended to judge the activities only on the 
reported number of participants rather than any changes supported. Only one programme 
logical framework (AAWAZ) explicitly measured empowerment outcomes in terms of 
increased agency and capacity to act, through regular tracking of skills and behaviours of 
trained community mobilisers or activists.  
 
8.1.2 Use of quantitative and qualitative measures 
Writing for DFID, Holland et al. (2009) recommend that empowerment and accountability 
aims should be measures with a focus on behavioural and institutional change in order to 
bridge the gap between ‘inputs’ and higher level outcomes, and by evidence of the quality of 
processes as well as the quantity of activities or participants. Later DFID guidance on 
designing programme measurement emphasises that qualitative process-focused measures 
might be more appropriate for ‘challenging environments’ and where long-term changes are 
the aim (DFID 2019b: 62). In the logical framework measures used by our focus 
programmes, however, there was a general tendency towards measures of quantity over 
interrogation of quality.  
 
There were a number of exceptions. The BCCSP was initially designed to use a set of 
qualitative scales of change on issues such as CSO capacity and multi-scalar linkages, using 
a qualitative assessment scorecard approach. Material from one component illustrates how 
stories of change were gathered to support this (British Council 2016a, 2016b). However 
implementation of the approach proved difficult and the final review of the programme 
queries the strength of the evidence gathered (DFID 2016b: 20). The Diálogo programme 
used ‘outcome mapping’ approaches to gather and judge evidence for higher level 
measures, and citizen perception studies at the start and mid-point. It also undertook a 
qualitatively based ‘ripple effect’ study on spill-over effects, although this didn’t inform the 
logical framework measures (Brook et al. 2017). The EVA-BHN programme also 
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commissioned more qualitative studies (EVA-BHN 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d), although 
again these didn’t feature in the official measurement of results.  
 
Associated with this, programme measurement frameworks also tended towards indicators 
that illustrated significant volumes of activity rather than the role of these activities in 
processes of change. Again, there were notable exceptions; the Diálogo framework theorised 
its output measures as steps in a process of capacity-building and reform, and there was a 
focus in higher level monitoring of the AAWAZ programme on changes in behaviour 
facilitated by the parallel processes of community-based empowerment and new spaces in 
which to make claims of authorities. A number of the frameworks included indicators which 
recorded very high numbers of beneficiaries or anticipated reach – for example potential 
audiences of media coverage or wider populations that may have been indirectly impacted 
by the programme activity. There were suggestions from our discussions with programme 
practitioners that these aspirational indicators were added to monitoring schemes largely to 
supply data for global indicators that DFID has used, for example on the aggregate number 
of people DFID programmes have supported to have increased ‘choice and control’. 
 
8.1.3 Measurement of multi-level and multi-scalar strategies and effects 
We analysed the logical frameworks for indications of measurement across vertical and 
horizontal scales and of multi-level interactions. The programmes incorporating a citizen-
based monitoring or demand aggregation logic (AAWAZ, CEP, EVA-BHN) all included 
indicators related to the volume of activity at different levels. The Alif Ailaan and BCSSP 
programmes measured the extent to which coalitions and networks built were multi-level, 
both in terms of geographic spread and at different vertical levels. The Diálogo programme’s 
logical framework had outcome measurements on the horizontal spread of participatory 
governance practices across municipalities, and advocacy efforts at a national level on the 
basis of programme evidence and experience at the municipal level. 
 
However, we found little logical framework measurement capturing articulation or interactions 
between sites or levels of action – how the work at each level influenced other levels. Both 
EVA-BHN and CEP specifically counted instances of ‘escalation’ of issues to an upper 
authority. In the case of CEP, a target was set specifically for the proportion of issues 
identified as needing higher level resolution which were then taken to a higher-level decision 
maker. The most concerted attempt to measure the interactions of levels was in the BCSSP 
programme, which had elements of its monitoring framework explicitly aimed at measuring 
the development of vertical and horizontal linkages. The programme planned to use a 
qualitative scale judged by a review panel, but the programme completion report suggests 
that in practice this did not work well, with methodological difficulties with the qualitative 
assessment scorecard approach hindering results (DFID 2013a, 2016b). In the absence of 
this the ‘output’ on the development of these linkages was measured by the membership of 
multi-scalar networks.  
 
8.2 Understanding processes of change and impact 
Although important in terms of institutional incentives and definitions of success, logical 
frameworks and official monitoring schemes might not be the best place to look for evidence 
that helps us understand complex change processes. Some argue these frameworks 
primarily perform internal and upward accountability functions in DFID programme 
management, rather than being contributions to evidence (Eyben et al. 2015; Valters and 
Whitty 2017). This was a view that also emerged during our practitioner interviews and 
workshop. Eyben refers to them as ‘disciplining artefacts’ that tend towards easily 
measurable outcomes (Eyben 2015) whilst the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact 
has expressed concern about the ‘distortive effect’ they have on learning by narrowing the 
scope of evidence collected (ICAI 2014: 29). Taking this into account, we researched other 
forms of programme evidence that might be considered more likely to explore longer-run 
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outcomes and processes of change. We looked in these for what we characterise as more 
‘evaluative’ material and judgements. 
 
One of the places that we looked for this evidence was in standard DFID programme 
documentation. Overall, we found annually completed review documentation to reflect little 
on the contribution of programmes to processes of change or to judge the relative effects of 
different activities. They were often limited by a standard paperwork format that only included 
commentary and measurement at the ‘output’ level of the logical framework. Many of these 
were indicators of volume and lacked discussion of the quality or meaningfulness of the 
demands and responses they counted – for example what kinds of demands were being 
raised and the nature and extent of their resolution. One hope might be that review 
paperwork ‘joins the dots’ between indicators in monitoring frameworks to indicate linkages 
and processes of change. This, however, wasn’t often the case. For example, where 
programmes involved outputs on both civic education/rights awareness activities and 
counting demands or issues raised with authorities, there was no discussion of whether the 
same people were involved in both kinds of activities. 
 
More recent versions of the standard DFID paperwork for annual reviews include additional 
sections to assess progress towards higher level outcomes and impacts, but for several of 
the programmes reviewed consideration of these wider effects were notably absent. This 
was less the case in mid-term annual reviews, which were in places more detailed on 
contribution and change – either based on independent evaluation or led by DFID staff 
external to the operating context. Annual review documentation largely exhibited similar 
upward accountability and project control characteristics to logical frameworks, and was 
spoken about in similar terms by programme practitioners. The function of the annual review 
to agree an annual performance ‘grade’ for programmes, affecting payments to implementers 
and reputations of those involved, was reported to overtake the desire for a broader 
understanding of changes taking place. We found programme completion reviews, which 
follow a format that is designed to prompt analysis on programme contributions to pre-
identified outcomes, more likely to engage in dynamics of change and interactions of 
activities with context, and a wider set of evidence. However, they did not often address 
multi-scalar or multi-level project designs in great depth or explicitly. 
 
We were also able to review a number of independent programme evaluations, and a volume 
of evidence produced by the programme implementer themselves. Table 8.2 summarises 
these sources, although it is important to say that not all of this material was available for us 
to review. As noted earlier evaluations did not exist for all programmes. This is in line with 
DFID’s overall strategy on programme evaluation, which emphasises programme-level 
decisions on evaluation approaches (summarised in Box 8.1). 
 
Box 8.1 DFID’s approach to programme evaluation 
DFID guidance uses the OECD Development Assistance Committee definition of evaluation as the ‘systematic 
and objective assessment of an on-going and completed project, programme or policy, its design, 
implementation and results in relation to specified evaluation criteria’, and emphasises that this happens within 
programmes, not only through external assessments (DFID 2013b). Programme evaluation in DFID largely 
follows what it calls a ‘decentralised’ model in which those responsible for designing and managing programmes 
also have the responsibility for building in evaluation activities (DFID 2013b). This approach reportedly ‘helps 
increase programme team ownership of the evaluation findings and helps facilitate the learning being applied to 
improve programme implementation’ (DFID 2019a: 7). The 2017/18 report from the central team responsible for 
supporting evaluation practice reports that 15 per cent of current programmes were being evaluated, and 30 per 
cent of bilateral spending was subject to evaluation processes (DFID 2019a: 6).  
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Table 8.2 Programme evidence – evaluations and other non-logframe sources 
Programme Evaluation approach Other evidence sources 
AAWAZ Initially independent monitoring and 
evaluation component, but absorbed 
within programme management during 
implementation and no evidence of 
programme evaluation  
Large number of published reports, although 
little exploration of programme theory. 
Alif Ailaan No evidence of programme evaluation 
outside of logframe. 
Reportedly, a significant monitoring database 
recording individual advocacy engagements. 
Independently commissioned ‘tracker studies’ 
on public and politician attitudes to inform 
logical framework. 
BCSSP Independent mid-term and final impact 
evaluation. 
Detailed impact assessment documents from 
separate projects.  
CEP Independent ‘Monitoring, Evaluation and 
Learning’ organisation contracted 
throughout. Baseline study, mid-term, 
and final evaluations completed. 
Detailed database recording outcomes of 
community scorecard processes. 
Diálogo Independent ‘Monitoring, Evaluation and 
Learning’ organisations contracted 
throughout. Baseline study, mid-term, 
and final evaluations completed. 
Separate ‘ripple effect’ study on spill-over 
benefits. 
EVA-BHN DFID-funded independent assessment 
completed following request during 
delivery from programme implementer. 
Tracer studies on impact completed by 
programme management. 
Detailed database recording issues raised at 
community level and their resolution. 
Academic working paper on programme 
approach to Social Accountability (Kirk 2017) 
 
The exemplar programmes in terms of evaluation evidence were those in Mozambique, 
although it should also be noted that these were not publicly available during our research. 
Both Mozambique programmes had baseline, mid-term and final evaluations undertaken by 
reviewers with some independence from the activity, appointed at the start of the 
programmes, and able to build up evidence and recommendations and engage in 
programme learning and adjustment over time. Both final evaluations (Brook et al. 2017; 
Shankland et al. 2017) engaged with the theory of change that underpinned the programmes 
and sought to assess evidence for the relationships and causality assumed in the 
programme design. This entailed actively looking for multi-level dynamics and the outcomes 
of multi-scalar strategies. The BCSSP final evaluation was not available for review, but the 
mid-term evaluation did look in depth at processes of change – for example the creation of 
social capital of different kinds across scales (DFID 2013a). It was limited however by the 
extent and kind of evidence collected from the monitoring scheme, and did not involve the 
degree of independent research and analysis that the Mozambique programmes did. 
 
The programmes in Pakistan had the most limited independent or external evaluation. The 
AAWAZ programme was originally designed to have an independent monitoring component, 
but this was later subsumed into the programme management role (DFID 2018c; Esser 
2018). The EVA-BHN programme was reviewed in a detailed independent assessment 
(Taylor and Khan 2017) that programme implementers argued was funded as a result of 
direct requests by the programme to DFID to help them evidence the importance of their 
contribution (Esser 2018). The assessment explored in some depth the kinds of issues 
raised at community level and where in the system these were resolved. It also looked 
substantially at the impact on wider system reform that might be attributed to the programme. 
It is notable however that this piece of work was largely framed in terms of health and health 
systems outcomes, rather than the governance outcomes we discuss here.  
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As a consequence, it re-figures ‘citizen demands’ from the original intention of citizens 
making claims on public services to ‘service demand’ in the sense of increased health centre 
use. This study was not an impact evaluation, although the content and analysis have 
evaluative characteristics.  
 
As indicated in Table 8.2, programmes reported other substantial sources of potential 
evidence outside of DFID programme monitoring and commissioned evaluation. We found 
that programme implementers had far more extensive evidence from their activities than 
were used in standard reporting or indeed in external evaluations where that took place. This 
supports a finding from a 2014 review on DFID learning processes, which argued that the 
lack of ability of DFID to use the depth of evidence generated by third-party programme 
implementers was a ‘key deficit’ (ICAI 2014: 27). The result of this is that whilst DFID 
documentation often only focused on one part of the multi-level system or a volume indicator 
(for example, number of issues raised), implementer reports and databases sometimes took 
a broader view – identifying patterns of issues raised and what issues were resolved (see for 
example Palladium (2017)). The Pyoe Pin component of the BCSSP produced impact case 
studies that addressed multi-level effects (British Council 2016b). The EVA-BHN programme 
developed a set of ‘tracer studies’ that explicitly traced the links and explored processes 
between activities at different levels, gathering qualitative evidence to show these 
interactions (EVA-BHN 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d). In both cases this content was not 
referred to substantially in DFID documentation.  
 
The programmes based on aggregating citizen demands – AAWAZ, CEP and EVA-BHN – all 
reported using specially developed databases tracking issues and their resolution across 
levels and scales. As noted, in the CEP programme the internal database was an important 
part of the vertical integration system itself, used by national partners to identify patterns and 
provide evidence for advocacy (Brook et al. 2017). In the case of Alif Ailaan, programme 
implementers reported a record of hundreds of meetings with officials, the commitments they 
made, and evidence that they had followed up on these (Esser 2018: 20). We were not able 
to interrogate these databases, or find significant evidence of them being used analytically to 
understand change pathways. However, they indicate a potential future source of analysis. 
Esser argues that the EVA-BHN and Alif Ailaan programmes have monitoring data that could 
hold ‘significant analytical potential’ for understanding how multi-level processes do and don’t 
lead to change (2018: 20). The same is arguably true of the CEP-created database, which 
was expanded to also include the results of other social accountability programming in 
Mozambique.  
 
8.3 Implications for learning 
DFID programmes are encouraged to develop contextually and programmatically suitable 
measures of progress and change (DFID 2019b: 62). The discussion in this section so far 
illustrates that the approaches to monitoring and evaluation within the programmes we 
looked at were accordingly reasonably diverse. Whilst the choice and comparability of 
measurement indicators and evaluation approaches might seem a fairly technical concern it 
has important ramifications.  
 
First, feedback we gathered from those designing and working within the programmes 
reflected a concern about whether, in fact, the activities were being judged against the right 
kinds of impacts and changes, or simply those things that were easiest to measure. Esser 
reports frustration amongst practitioners at what they saw as ‘the donor’s’ quantitative 
measurement emphasis (2018: 22). DFID participants in our discussions noted the difficulties 
of instituting the kinds of measurement that they felt were more appropriate for these 
programme activities, and the realities that that what appears in official measurement often 
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responds to upward accountability and project management needs over learning10. A DFID 
case study on the monitoring and evaluation approach of the SAVI programme in Nigeria, 
included in our document review but not a case study programme, notes that over time the 
programme was pushed to develop indicators that might be simpler to understand than its 
sophisticated qualitative scales of behaviour change, such as the passage of specific pieces 
of legislation (Derbyshire and Donovan 2016: 7). This opens up a potential gap between 
what programmes are measured on and what they are actually seeking to do – one that 
undermines their contribution to the evidence base as well as producing ongoing tension 
between practices and measurements of success. 
 
Second, the devolved nature of programme measurement and learning and the lack of 
interrogation of causal pathways and change strategies in programme documentation limits 
how far the resemblances we have established between the programmes allows real 
comparison. The greatest potential for more comparative learning might lie in the detailed 
programme monitoring systems and databases. However, these are not considered 
‘products’ of the programme and are owned by competing implementing organisations. 
Undertaking this kind of analysis would require new levels of collaboration that go beyond the 
immediate needs of those running projects. This has ramifications for the design of any 
research seeking to learn from these activities and significant investments. Whilst we might 
not expect comparability of programmes in terms of precisely the same indicators or 
measures, it does seem reasonable that evidence could be available to shape into a 
comparative framework, which we didn’t find to be the case. 
 
Third, and associated with this last point, our review of the measurement of change in these 
programmes and discussions with practitioners suggests barriers to sharing and interrogating 
evidence that emerge from organisational politics and commercial competition. Various 
contributions to the study of international development programmes have highlighted the 
macro and micro ‘politics of evaluation’ (O’Brien et al. 2010; Roche and Kelly 2012). 
Rigorous evaluative consideration of programme strategies comes with the risk that the 
planned effects aren’t found, and the risk of appearing to ‘fail’ has been noted elsewhere in 
terms of constraints to DFID evaluation practice (ICAI 2014). In a recent contribution on the 
politics of development assistance, Yanguas (2018: 163) notes the tight control of political 
economy analyses and other internal knowledge within DFID field offices. Whilst DFID’s 
reputation amongst donors and with national governments can be affected by negative 
evaluation results, arguably the strongest dynamic against transparent evaluation that 
emerged from our work was the extent of commercial competition between implementing 
organisations. Our case study work in Mozambique and Pakistan highlighted the level of 
competition for resources between not only the large main contractors of DFID, but also 
amongst the collection of local NGOs and CSOs that are then their sub-contractors. This 
environment means that learning how to do this work well has a commercial value. It also 
produces a bias towards ‘success stories’ that may limit learning from when similar strategies 
don’t work.  
 
It is important to say that we found an appetite for learning and examples of positive 
collaboration amongst practitioners across the programmes despite these larger 
organisational or institutional barriers. This was particularly apparent when we brought 
together practitioners from programmes run by different providers, along with DFID 
programme managers as part of our research. This suggested that a form of community of 
practice does exist, transferring learning across programmes, and in particular as 
practitioners move between them. In these discussions, practitioners were keen and happy 
to put the competitive pressures aside in this kind of facilitated and closed-door discussion. 
 
10  Eyben, based on experience working within DFID, is of the view that these pressures and the logical framework 
approach taken ‘normalise inappropriate means for designing and assessing development programmes’ (Eyben 2015: 
34). 
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However, this enthusiasm does relatively little to support a grounded, open and systematic 
analysis of what kinds of strategies work to address governance challenges in complex 
settings.  
 
 
9  Conclusions and implications 
Have these programmes shown the adoption and effectiveness of multi-scalar strategies in 
donor-supported empowerment and accountability activities? How far do they contribute to 
an evidence base for working in this way as a means to build countervailing power and 
increase accountability of decision makers to the wider population? In concluding, we assess 
our findings against the driving questions of our study, and draw out some implications both 
for further study and the field more widely.  
 
We found many of the programmes adopted multi-scalar strategies. This should not be taken 
for granted and indicates an awareness of those involved of the need to be more strategic 
and work across the governance landscape to achieve change. In the case of more social 
accountability focused activities in particular it represents a welcome acknowledgement of 
the existing evidence base on ‘low accountability traps’ and an attempt to overcome the 
limitations of earlier social accountability programming and donor activity that assumed that 
stimulating citizen voice was either easy or sufficient in itself to lead to change. In other 
programmes the multi-scalar approaches taken also seem important to their logic and 
practice although these might not have been so overtly stated. This serves as a reminder 
that the ‘how’ of building pro-accountability reform deserves more detailed attention than the 
broad appeals in the existing literature and guidance to ‘work politically’ and take ‘adaptive’ 
approaches. The programmes remind us that building countervailing power, in particular of 
previously excluded or marginalised groups, needs to be viewed not in terms of technical 
fixes but in terms of what strategies work best in campaigns and mobilisations to challenge 
inertia and embedded narrow interests. Within this, the kinds of multi-level strategies 
recommended by a part of the existing literature clearly deserve more attention and bringing 
to the fore, and our study of a limited number of programmes suggests that the practice – if 
not the evidence – is out there. 
 
Exploring these programmes has also helped us to begin to clarify some different ways in 
which multi-scalar strategies might be incorporated into local campaigns, whether donor-
funded or otherwise. Although potentially complementary, there is a distinct difference 
between using vertically-integrated strategies to empower people to make appeals upward 
and activate accountability in various places in a bureaucratic and policy hierarchy on the 
one hand, and joining local observers and campaigners with experienced national policy 
advocates on the other. It is interesting that only one programme we reviewed – the Citizen’s 
Engagement Programme in Mozambique – actually tried to do both of these in substantial 
ways, rather than focusing on one over the other. The distinction between these and 
horizontal scale is more obvious, but it is also interesting that horizontal scale was the least 
prioritised in programme designs as far as we could see, and limited in some cases to 
looking for replication of successful activities. This disaggregation could helpfully be applied 
to other cases of action or donor programming. Given what we’ve seen, there may be a 
particular advantage in bringing the literature on the horizontal spread and diffusion of 
movements and spatialities of activism to the fore in the analysis of accountability reform 
strategies. There could also be more done to understand the longer-run impacts through 
‘ripple effects’. 
 
Looking at these programmes also gives us some further ideas on why multi-scalar 
strategies might be worth trying in promoting greater accountability, and where we should 
look to trace how they work. By synthesising from programme reports to disaggregate three 
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key areas of ‘effects’ we have been able to draw attention to a number of ways that they 
seem beneficial. This highlights a number of framings and propositions that might call for 
further examination. Whilst we don’t have an evidence base from these programmes to test 
the proposition of Fox (2016, Fox et al. 2016) that vertically integrated approaches offer more 
purchase than less integrated alternatives, we can see within recent practice some examples 
emerge that could be added to a larger set of cases to start this testing. We can also add to 
the proposition with some ideas and further evidence on why this might be the case; the 
importance of higher level authority oversight and its existence as an enforcer of local 
responsiveness, the availability of recourse where this isn’t possible, and the provision of 
multiple channels through which blockages and resistance might circumvented. The effects 
we found on solidarity and legitimacy – aspects of the strength of citizen’s collective actions – 
are relatively absent from the language used to assess and understand donor-led 
programmes. There are probably good reasons not to use these more overtly political terms 
in official programme documents, but it might be fruitful to take this lens across a wider set of 
cases, recognising that these two factors may not be explicit. Finally, there seems scope to 
look more precisely at the different ways in which policy reform can be leveraged and have 
impact. The programmes used multi-level strategies not only to attempt reforms to the 
content of policy, but also to the nature of state-citizen relations. This offers an important 
reminder that the effects of these programmes and sets of activities are likely to be much 
longer run than their periods of funding and the tracing of immediate impact. In the case of 
Pakistan, we also see how likely it is that these sets of activity have some interaction 
themselves, although we weren’t able to explore this. 
 
There is a substantial caveat to these conclusions, however. We hoped that in the monitoring 
and evaluation schemes and evidence generated from a sample of programmes we could 
find sufficiently robust and comparable evidence to make some broad statements about what 
is more effective, and how this interacts with difficult and unpredictable contexts. This wasn’t 
the case. The available monitoring and evaluation of the programmes was insufficient to 
make sound judgements on how well multi-scalar strategies work and their impacts on 
accountability relationships in these externally supported initiatives. There were three main 
limitations here.  
 
The first is the simple availability of evidence, with the detail of what went on in these 
initiatives hard to come by and assess, despite DFID’s commitment to transparency and 
desire to learn from practice. Whilst some of this is driven by inconsistent practices in 
publishing relevant material, some certainly appears to be driven by the nature of competitive 
incentives. Doing this work well gives commercial advantage for DFID sub-contractors and is 
part of how DFID programme managers and country offices are judged. Independent 
interrogation of evidence is not necessarily in many people’s interests, and evidence of 
success or otherwise becomes commercially sensitive. 
 
The second limitation is the disjointed nature of most programmes’ monitoring and evaluation 
schemes, and incongruities between what practitioners say they are setting out to achieve 
and what is measured and published. These are sharpest in relation to the outcomes of the 
programmes. Implementers say that they are seeking longer-run changes in state-society 
relations and balances of power and that sustainability comes about through ongoing 
patterns of pro-accountability behaviours, conditions, and re-shaped norms, rather than the 
continuation of mechanisms that they have used in the short-run to motivate these 
behaviours. Those external to the programmes, including sometimes DFID managers and 
others involved judging programme success, often see sustainability in terms of those 
mechanisms being institutionalised so that they no longer need to be donor-funded and 
‘scaled up’ to reach more people. This is a wider issue in the politics and incentives of 
development donor management, and what became referred to in our practitioner workshop 
as ‘the invisible power of the logframe’.  
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Partly driven by these first two factors, the final limitation here is that we found little scope for 
robust comparison between programmes’ evidence. Thus, the similarity of these 
programmes in design and intent does not result in comparability in research terms. Whilst 
DFID has invested in other important ways to develop the evidence base for empowerment 
and accountability programmes, we see missed opportunities to learn from the programmes 
we’ve explored and use their activities as part of that evidence base. It is doubtless important 
that programmes develop contextually suitable schemes to generate evidence of what is 
working and not, and DFID’s decentralised approach to programme design and evaluation 
activity supports this. However, the latitude provided in this approach has important 
implications for the wider field of study and also for DFID’s ambitions to engage in evidence-
informed programming and to ensure learning from its work. From our study there are clear 
and interesting examples of applying what has been learnt from previous systematic study of 
empowerment and accountability programmes, but several of these didn’t seem to provide 
the kinds of evidence that could expand this systematisation of knowledge and practice.  
 
All of the programmes that we explored identified in their documentation conditions 
associated with fragility, conflict and violence. This was particularly the case in evidence 
related to programme design. We see relatively little direct engagement with these conditions 
in more retrospective analysis, although arguably they were attempting to address key 
characteristics of fragility in developing new state-society relationships and (in line with the 
DFID theory of change) widening the political settlement. This is perhaps not surprising given 
the focus of the activity on particular countries, localities, and sectors, and that addressing 
these broader conditions were not often identified in programme monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks. However, a number of points emerge from our analysis that might indicate what 
is especially important in considering multi-level and multi-scalar empowerment and 
accountability in conditions of fragility, conflict and violence.  
 
First there are a set of implications for programme design and implementation. One is that 
multi-level strategies and designs need to be based on where decision-making and authority 
lie. The examples we have looked at highlight how far this is likely to be in flux as a result of 
the contestations going on in political and civil society. This identification of sites of action 
also highlights the complexities of seeking to use existing governance spaces – which may 
be subject to elite capture or co-option, to be taking a particular ‘side’ in a conflict or may 
maintain exclusionary norms – versus creating new spaces. In both the Pyoe Pin and EVA-
BHN strategies new spaces with newly inclusive norms were overtly part of the strategy. 
Strategies in Mozambique tended to focus on expanding practice in parts of the governance 
structure seen as most malleable – co-management committees of local services and in 
municipal governance. Associated with these points, several of the programmes provide 
examples of the importance of informal power and powerholders, and how they can be 
targeted as part of a multi-level strategy.  
 
Second, our analysis of the effects of multi-scalar strategies emphasises coalition-building 
practices and outcomes that might be particularly important where actors have been 
fragmented and the distribution of legitimate authority and representation is unsettled. The 
practical implications of this are less clear, but the importance that emerges here suggests 
some question about how deliberately programmes approach the issues of building power 
within and through coalitions. This touches on issues of the underpinning theories of change 
in complex contexts, and through what mechanisms programmes might achieve ‘scale’ in the 
sense of an impact wider than their particular sub-national sites or sectors. In contexts where 
processes of social change might be less predictable, or the channels through which they 
operate more fluid, we see some challenges to declared ambitions that geographically limited 
pilots might be enthusiastically embraced, and in practice a perhaps more realistic view of 
programme intervention as a series of ‘nudges’ to the (assumed) social contract. 
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Taken together, the results of our study suggest that in important ways DFID empowerment 
and accountability programmes are taking scale into account – even in contexts with 
particularly complex and conflictual governance arrangements. Incorporating multi-scalar 
strategies may be producing important effects. They may also in the future offer lessons for 
other processes of social change and establishment and mobilisation of countervailing 
power. There is a clear case for applying the lens of scale, as we have used it here, to other 
cases, and finding ways to get the evidence that allows a more robustly comparative study. 
However, the evidence needed to make the kinds of judgements required on dynamics of 
change seems either not gathered or not shared in current DFID and programme 
implementer practice. Advancing the field therefore requires concerted collaboration of 
practitioners and researchers or significant interventions on the part of funders to make a 
more secure contribution to evidence. Only if monitoring and learning investments are more 
aligned with tracking effects of these strategies can we answer important and pressing 
questions of how donors can support citizens in navigating governance systems to make 
them work in their favour, and contribute to the significant shifts of power needed to 
overcome anti-accountability forces.  
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